Real-time payment system, method, apparatus, and computer program

ABSTRACT

A method, system, apparatus, and computer program for conducting a real-time payment transaction. The method includes receiving a request for payment from a creditor financial institution (FI), and forwarding it to a debtor (FI). A payment transaction message is received from the debtor financial institution, specifying an amount of payment requested in the request, and is forwarded to the creditor FI such that the amount of payment is credited to an account in real-time. The debtor FI can request a return of the payment, in which case the creditor FI can comply therewith or refuse the return the payment. Also, an unsettled financial position of the debtor FI can be settled where that position does not exceed a combination of a pre-funded balance in a settlement account and a net debit cap value, and multiple settlements can be performed depending on a relationship between the position and combination.

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION

The present application claims priority to U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/187,406, filed Jul. 1, 2015, and U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/286,738, filed Jan. 25, 2016, the contents of which are incorporated by reference herein in their entirety, as if set forth fully herein.

BACKGROUND Field

Example aspects herein relate generally to electronic transactions and, more specifically, to electronic real-time payment transactions.

Description of the Related Art

The average banking customer interacts with his or her bank or financial institution at least twice a day for payment-related matters, such as buying a financial product, checking on a payment, or paying a bill. These interactions represent more than 80 percent of customer interactions with banks, making payments a superb platform, or beachhead, for cross-selling other financial services. Indeed, payment revenue is increasingly targeted by non-banks, and, missing out on these fees could detrimentally impact the capture of all possible banking related revenue.

However, the competition for the beachhead is intensifying, particularly in the area of mobile payments and digital payments.

Financial transfers today take place more quickly than before, but consumers are still burdened with needing to review their accounts to identify unauthorized or false transactions, and disputing such transactions with their financial institutions. Faster payment capabilities, along with robust consumer protections against fraud, unauthorized transactions, and erroneous debits, can help to alleviate these limitations at least somewhat.

Indeed, the Federal Reserve itself has developed a roadmap for a “near real time” payments system, and has noted that the financial services industry has a sense of urgency in pursuing this objective. The Federal Reserve has created task forces charged with advisory roles focused on defining faster payments capabilities, and payment security.

Various countries (e.g., Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UK)) offer a real-time credit push and a debit capability not in real-time (i.e., a transaction cleared on deferred basis). A so-called Fast Payment service exists in the United Kingdom (UK), as does a FAST service in Singapore. Both follow a typical model for providing immediate funds availability. For example, 97% of payment transactions are made available to a recipient within 60 seconds of receipt. For transactions not posted within 60 seconds, the payer is informed that transaction is under review.

To meet this standard, a receiving financial institution (FI) must have real-time screening for suspected fraud, AML, and sanctions (FIG. 47 represents known automated fraud detection systems and their capabilities). The remaining 3% of transactions are reviewed within 2 hours and are either ultimately rejected or posted.

Swish and PayM mobile P2P in Sweden and the UK purportedly provide immediate notification and credit, ClearXchange and PopMoney in the U.S. purportedly provide immediate notification with deferred credit, and Venmo and Square Cash purportedly provide immediate notification and immediate/or deferred credit. However, none of those services actually provide a service with a real-time crediting and settlement capability (i.e., posting of funds immediately to a creditor's account).

Instead, settlement often occurs within hours of a payment initiation. The UK Faster Payments service moved to full cash pre-funding of net settlement liabilities in November of 2014, effectively using a central bank balance as a net debit cap (i.e., a defaulter pays). Prior to that date, a multilateral debit cap was employed.

In a credit push scenario, a sending FI can verify and secure good funds. By not having debits, the risk of a reversal due to fraudulent and/or unauthorized debits is removed.

The Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) addresses the risk of unsettled debit positions for wholesale wire transfers by requiring participants to prefund a settlement pool, while using an algorithm that continuously nets positions to reduce a funding requirement.

Also, currently, in the case of a payment error, existing processes for returning funds are manual, costly, and unsatisfying for consumers. PayM purportedly has features to reduce sending errors. For example, a payer can enter payment instructions and an alias account, and PayM looks up payee information in a database of registered users based on an account alias provided. Payer confirms the name of the payee presented by PayM prior to executing a transaction. Also, PopMoney services enable users to send funds using an email address. PayM and Swish in Sweden enable users to send payments to registered payees by providing a telephone number.

In view of the foregoing, there is a need to develop and implement an actual real-time payment system with real-time settlement to better meet consumers' and businesses' expectations in an increasingly digital economy, while minimizing or substantially reducing fraudulent or unauthorized transactions and the like, and streamlining processes for returning funds and correcting errors.

BRIEF SUMMARY

The example embodiments discussed herein address the challenges in the art discussed above, by providing methods, and systems, apparatuses, computer-readable media, and computer programs that operate in accordance with the methods, for performing real-time payment transactions.

In accordance with one example embodiment herein, one of the methods comprises receiving an electronic request for payment message from a creditor financial institution, and forwarding the electronic request for payment message to the debtor financial institution. The electronic request for payment message requests that a payment be made to the creditor financial institution. The method also includes receiving, from the debtor financial institution, an electronic payment transaction message, the electronic payment transaction message including information specifying an amount of payment requested in the electronic request for payment message. The electronic payment transaction message is forwarded to the creditor financial institution such that the amount of payment is credited to an account at the creditor financial institution in real-time. The method also includes receiving an electronic request for return of funds message from the debtor financial institution. The electronic request for return of funds message requests that the amount of payment be returned to the debtor financial institution. The electronic request for return of funds message is forwarded to the creditor financial institution.

For at least one of the electronic request for payment message, the electronic payment transaction message, and the electronic request for return of funds message, at least one token included in the message is correlated to a bank account number and routing number, and the message is forwarded based on at least the routing number. Also, each of the messages preferably includes a unique transaction identifier.

The at least one token can be static or dynamic, and/or can be subject to domain restrictions.

According to another example embodiment herein, the method further comprises receiving an electronic return of funds message from the creditor financial institution and forwarding that message to the debtor financial institution. The electronic return of funds message includes information specifying payment of the amount of payment requested in the electronic request for return of funds message.

Also in accordance with an example embodiment herein, the method also can include determining whether any of the messages is at least one of a duplicate message, an invalid message, and a possible fraudulent transaction, and generating an exception message in response to detecting that any of the messages is at least one of a duplicate message, an invalid message, and a possible fraudulent transaction.

Furthermore, according to another example embodiment herein, the method can further comprise receiving at least one of a pending status message, an accepted status message, and a rejected status message from the creditor financial institution, in relation to the electronic payment transaction message.

In still a further embodiment herein, the method further comprises detecting that no response has been received from the creditor financial institution in response to the electronic payment transaction message, within a predetermined time period, and notifying the debtor financial institution that no response was received from the creditor financial institution.

In still a further example embodiment herein, the method further comprises receiving a request for information message from the creditor financial institution and forwarding that message to the debtor financial institution, the request for information message requesting that the creditor financial institution be provided with predetermined information. A responsive message to the request for information message is received from the debtor financial institution, and forwarded to the creditor financial institution, wherein the responsive message includes the predetermined information.

Also in an example embodiment herein, the method further comprises receiving a remittance advice message including remittance advice from the debtor financial institution and forwarding the remittance advice message to the creditor financial institution.

According to another example embodiment herein, the method further comprises comparing an unsettled financial position of the debtor financial institution to a combination of a value of a pre-funded balance in a settlement account and a value of a net debit cap, and determining whether to perform a financial settlement based on a result of the comparing. Thus, according to an example aspect herein, a settlement account can be pre-funded.

Additionally, the method can further comprise performing the financial settlement where it is determined that the unsettled financial position of the debtor financial institution is not greater than the combination. The financial settlement can be performed multiple times within a predetermined time period, although it need not be, and other settlement techniques can be employed instead.

According to another example aspect herein, one of the methods performs financial settlement. The method according to this example aspect comprises pre-funding a financial settlement account with a balance, and comparing an unsettled financial position of a financial institution to a combination of a value of the balance of the settlement account and a value of a net debit cap. Next, the method includes determining whether to perform a financial settlement based on a result of the comparing, and performing a financial settlement where it is determined that the unsettled financial position of the debtor financial institution is not greater than the combination. The method also can include determining whether there is a predetermined number of financial institutions that have unsettled financial positions, and increasing a frequency at which financial settlements are performed, in response to determining that there is the predetermined number of financial institutions that have unsettled financial positions.

The real-time payments system herein is a safe, sustainable, standards-based retail real-time payment system that has an ability to reach financial institutions and position them to be pre-eminent providers of innovative payment services to their customers, by providing a fully featured product platform with extensible messaging and robust security.

Further features and advantages, as well as the structure and operation, of various example embodiments are described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The features and advantages of the example embodiments presented herein will become more apparent from the detailed description set forth below when taken in conjunction with the drawings. Like reference numbers between two or more drawings can denote identical or functionally similar elements unless the description indicates otherwise.

FIG. 1 is a diagram of an example real time payments system according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 1A is an example computer system configured in accordance with example embodiments herein.

FIG. 2 illustrates a flow diagram of a process for effecting a real time payment, according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 3 illustrates a flow diagram of a process for conducting a system time out and generating a status report, according to another example embodiment herein.

FIG. 4 illustrates a flow diagram of a process for requesting payment, according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 5 illustrates a flow diagram of a process for requesting a return of funds, according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 6 illustrates a flow diagram of a process for providing a response to a request for return of funds, according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 7 illustrates a flow diagram of a process for requesting information, in accordance with an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 8 illustrates a flow diagram of a process for responding to a request for information, in accordance with an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 9 illustrates a flow diagram of a process for providing remittance advice, in accordance with an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 10 illustrates a flow diagram of a process for providing status updates, in accordance with an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 11 illustrates a process flow for a credit transfer process, according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 12 illustrates a process flow for a credit transfer and system timeout, according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 13 illustrates a process flow for requesting payment, according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 14 illustrates another process flow for requesting payment, according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 15 illustrates a process flow for requesting a return of funds, according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 16 illustrates a process flow for requesting information, in accordance with an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 17 illustrates a process flow for providing remittance advice, in accordance with an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 18 illustrates a process flow for providing exception messages, in accordance with an example embodiment herein.

FIGS. 19a and 19c are further diagrams of an example real time payments system according to example embodiments herein.

FIGS. 19b and 19d show examples of various messages that can be used in the procedures described herein, according to example embodiments herein.

FIGS. 20a-20c show various message types, IDS codes, message names, and definitions of message types, for messages that can be employed in the procedures herein, according to example embodiments herein.

FIG. 21 shows an example of a multiple message process flow for a business to business transaction scenario herein.

FIG. 22 shows an example of a hybrid real time payment service according to an example scenario herein.

FIG. 23 shows an example of a business to person transaction scenario.

FIG. 24 shows an example of a person to person transaction scenario.

FIG. 25 shows an example of a person to business transaction scenario.

FIG. 26 shows an example of a business to business transaction scenario.

FIG. 27 represents another example of a business to person context, such as a case where a payment is made of a temporary employee's wages, according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 28 represents a person to person context for non-commerce payments, according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 29 is an example representation of a business to person scenario, such as, for example, an urgent disaster relief payment process according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 30 represents a further example of a person to person context, such as a case where an urgent account-to-account payment is made, according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 31 shows an example fraud detection process, according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 32 represents still a further person to person context, such as for payment for an informal service, according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 33 represents a person to business context, such as for an immediate bill payment, according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 34 represents a business to business scenario, such as a just in time payment to a supplier, according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 35 represents a business to business context, such as for an immediate bill payment, according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 36 represents an example of a request for return of funds procedure context, according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 37 represents an example process herein for detecting duplicate transactions.

FIG. 38 represents an example process herein for detecting an invalid token.

FIG. 39 represents an example of non-payment administrative messages that can be employed in the procedures herein.

FIG. 40 represents an example process for rejecting a payment.

FIG. 41 represents an example process for making an e-commerce payment, and providing fulfillment advice.

FIG. 42 shows an example where timeouts are employed with regard to payment instructions.

FIG. 43 represents an example of the impact on a total settlement capacity a financial institution, in a case where pre-funding is employed in conjunction with a net debit cap, or where only one of those is employed.

FIG. 44 represents example types of financial settlement procedures that can be employed herein.

FIG. 45 shows examples of various types of messages and certain characteristics thereof.

FIG. 46 shows a flow diagram of a settlement procedure according to an example embodiment herein.

FIG. 47 represents known automated fraud detection systems and their capabilities.

Again, identical portions of the various figures have been identified with the same reference numerals in order to simplify the descriptions thereof, and a detailed description may not be provided with respect to each figure.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

FIG. 1 is a diagram of a system 100 configured in accordance with an example embodiment herein. System 100 includes user stations 110 and 121. In an example embodiment, user station 110 is operated by, under the authorization of, or on behalf of a debtor (e.g., an individual, business, government, etc.), and user station 121 is operated by, under the authorization of, or on behalf of a creditor (e.g., an individual, business, government, etc.). In this example, the debtor may owe one or more debts to the creditor. Accordingly, user station 110 can be referred to as a “debtor station,” and user station 121 can be referred to as a “creditor station.” Each user station may be, for example, a personal computer, a tablet computer, a smartphone, a standalone computer terminal such as a kiosk or ATM, or any other suitable type of electronic device for receiving, transmitting, storing, and/or processing information.

System 100 also includes financial institutions (FIs) 111 and 120. In an example embodiment, a user associated with station 110 can receive banking services (e.g., account services such as access to demand deposit accounts and savings accounts, brokerage services, and electronic bill payment and present services and the like) from FI 111. Similarly, a user associated with station 121 receives banking services from FI 120. Accordingly, FI 111 can be referred to as a “debtor FI,” and FI 120 can be referred to as a “creditor FI.” Each FI includes one or more computers and/or servers, such as, for example, the system of FIG. 1A, which are configured to handle electronic financial transactions.

Debtor station 110 is connected to (e.g., can electronically communicate with) debtor FI 111. Accordingly, the debtor may use station 110 to access banking services provided by FI 111 through, for example, an online banking portal available through a web browser running on station 110, banking software loaded on to station 110, or any other banking service provided by FI 111 on station 110. Similarly, creditor station 121 is connected to creditor FI 120. Station 110 and 121 also may connect to other elements as well, such as other elements of system 100.

Debtor FI 111 and creditor FI 120 are connected to each other by an Automated Clearinghouse (ACH) network 130 (e.g., such as, without limitation, one or more of the Electronic Payments Network (EPN) and the FedACH). ACH network 130 can route (e.g., receive and transmit) electronic transactions and various types of messages between FIs via message interfaces 112 and 114, as described hereinbelow. ACH network 130 can include one or more computers and/or servers (such as, for example, the system shown in FIG. 1A) which are configured to handle electronic financial transactions. ACH network 130 also can include one or more databases. The ACH network 130 also is referred to as a system 130 herein.

Each connection (as indicated by a dual-headed arrow) illustrated in FIG. 1 can be any suitable type of existing or later-developed connection between one or more computers (or computing devices). In one example, at least part of one or more of such connections may include a network such as a local-area network (LAN), wide-area network (WAN), or the Internet. For example, station 110 may be a computing device (e.g., a PC or smartphone) that connects, via the Internet, to one or more web pages maintained or hosted by or on behalf of FI 111.

In one example embodiment, stations 110 and 121 can be connected by a secure communication channel (as indicated by the dashed arrow) on which communications may proceed after a single sign-on (SSO) procedure is performed in which a member using station 110 logs in to an online banking service provided by FI 111, although this example is neither limiting nor exclusive. In such a procedure, debtor FI 111 can be configured as a SAML identity provider, and station 121 can be configured as a SAML service provider. Accordingly, through communication between FI 111 (as the SAML identity provider) and station 121 (as the SAML service provider), a secure communication channel between station 110 and 121 can be established. In one example embodiment, such a secure communication channel is provided by way of network 130, which enables the SSO procedure to be effected.

Network 130 also includes a core processing system 131, an administrative system 132, a settlement system 133. Network 130 also can include one or more databases. Generally, core processing system 131 performs processes such as payment processing, message validation, duplicate message checking, transaction state management, acknowledgements, non-payment processing, administrative message processing, and system message processing. The core processing system 131 also performs processes such as message routing, transaction routing, routing to a value added service system (to be described below), and end-point fraud management. The system 131 also performs processes such as system security processes, authorization and authentication, user access management, and fraud detection.

The administrative system 132 performs administrative processes such as operations processing, participant onboarding, helpdesk and customer service, control room system monitoring, data management, conducting inquiries and investigations, and bank administration. Additionally, system 132 performs reporting processes such as dashboard processing, operations reporting, statistics reporting, performance reporting, pricing and billing, regulatory reporting, and internal audit reporting. System 132 also performs government and rules management processing, maintains business rules, effects change management, participant management, audits, and risk management. The settlement service system 133 performs settlement processing to enable financial transactions to be settled, manages multilateral net settlement positions, settlement notifications, and transmits/receives data to/from at least one settlement facility 134. That facility 134 also can communicate with the FIs 111 and 120 by way of gateways 115 and interfaces 114.

The system 100 also can include a value added service system 138 connected to (or within) the network 130 and the FIs 111 and 120. The system 138 performs various valued-added services such as, for example, directory services and maintenance, fraud management, analysis, and reporting, and token services. The system 100 can include one or more computers and/or servers, such as, for example, the system shown in FIG. 1A.

System 100 further can include third party service providers 142 which can be, for example, payment service providers, a biller or a clearinghouse. In the system 100, the third party can receive bills and payments from FIs and send them to other FIs 111. Third party 142 can include one or more computers and/or servers, such as, for example, the system shown in FIG. 1A.

In the illustrated example, the systems 138 and 134 are represented as being separate from ACH network 130, and at least some parts of the below description is made in the context of that example embodiment. However, it should be understood that the scope of the invention is not limited to that example only. For example, it is also within the scope of the invention for the systems 138 and 134 to be included in, operated by, or otherwise be a part of ACH network 130, and one skilled in the art would understand in view of this description how to adapt the functionalities described herein where needed to accommodate such an embodiment.

Elements of system 100 can be configured to perform one or more of the steps or functions associated with any of the processes discussed herein, including those illustrated in the flow diagrams shown in the Figures and those discussed in connection therewith.

Example Computer Systems

FIG. 1A is a diagram of an example computer system. In example embodiments, the computer system may form at least part of one or more of the components illustrated in FIG. 1, and may be configured to perform one or more steps of the processes illustrated in the Figures. For example, a debtor FI and creditor FI can include one or more servers, each which can include one or more computer systems like that of FIG. 1A. As another example, a user station (e.g. stations 110 and/or 121) can include one or more computer systems.

The system of FIG. 1A includes a processor 1802, a memory 1803, a storage device 1804, a communications device 1805, and one or more user interfaces 1806, all of which are coupled to a bus 1801.

Processor 1802 can communicate with the other components of the computer system through bus 1801. Storage device 1804 includes one or more computer-readable media. Storage device 1804 can be configured to read and write data including program instructions that may be executed by processor 1802 and operating systems (e.g., a general-purpose operating system, such as Microsoft Windows and UNIX, or a custom operating system) that allow processor 1802 to control the operation of the other components. Communications device 1805 can be configured to enable processor 1802 to communicate with, for example, a network and the internet. User interface(s) 1806 can include input devices (e.g., keyboards, mice, joysticks, trackpads, stylus tablets, microphones, and cameras), output devices (e.g., video displays, printers, and speakers), and input/output devices (e.g., touch screens). User interface(s) 1806 can form at least part of any of the devices, components, and/or systems discussed herein.

Processor 1802 is configured to perform part (or all) of any of the processes described herein, depending on which component(s) of FIG. 1 the computer system forms a part of. For example, processes such as all or part of those of the flow diagrams described herein can be stored on storage device 1804 in the form of computer-readable program instructions. To execute a process, the processor loads the appropriate instructions, as stored on storage device 1804, into memory 1803, and then executes the loaded instructions to perform electronic transaction services, such as to, for example, generate, transmit, and/or receive a request for enrollment in the delivery of electronic information, or generate, transmit, and/or receive an electronic EOB, EOP, bill, and/or bill summary, and/or generate, receive, or otherwise process a payment transaction as described above.

Example Real-Time Payment Procedures

An example real-time payments procedure according to an example embodiment herein will now be described. Referring now to FIG. 2 (and FIG. 11), in addition to being able to obtain access to and view, summary and detailed bills, a user (e.g., associated with station 110) can connect to their FIs' (e.g., via an on-line banking website) to authorize a payment of an amount from the user's account with a debtor FI (e.g., FI 111) to creditors, billers, and the like (e.g., associated with station 121), creditor FIs (e.g., FI 120), or other entities, based on the accessed item(s) (step 201). After receiving payment authorization (e.g., a payment authorization message) from a consumer (step 202), such as, for example, via a channel specific message, a FI (e.g., FI 111) checks the account associated with the user to determine whether the account has a sufficient amount of funds available to cover the payment amount (step 203). Where sufficient funds are determined to be available, the debtor FI 111 then determines whether the requested payment can be processed in real time (step 204). In one example embodiment, step 204 is performed by the FI 111 determining (i) whether the creditor FI 120 identified in the payment authorization has a capability to receive real time payments (i.e., is “real time enabled”), (ii) determining whether the payment amount is less than a predetermined individual transaction limit of the system 100, and (iii) determining whether the payment amount is less than a predetermined client specific transaction value set by the FI 111. For example, determination (i) can involve the FI 111 associating an identifier of the creditor FI 121 included in the payment authorization with associated predetermined information stored in the debtor FI 111 indicating whether or not the creditor FI 121 supports real time payment capability. In another example embodiment, the ACH network 130 stores the predetermined information, and the determination is made by the debtor FI 111 communicating with the ACH network 130 to determine whether the predetermined information indicates that the creditor FI 120 supports real time payment capability. In still another example embodiment, the predetermined information is stored elsewhere, in another element, of the system 100, such as in the creditor FI 120, and the determination is made by the debtor FI 111 communicating with that element to determine whether the predetermined information indicates that the creditor FI 121 supports real time payment capability. The determination (ii) similarly can involve similar procedures for determining whether the payment amount is less than a predetermined transaction limit of the system 100 (i.e., the amount included in the payment authorization is checked against a limit that may be included in the FI 111 or 120, the ACH network 130, or in another element of the system 100).

If any of the determinations (i), (ii), and (iii) results in a determination of “No” (“No” in step 205), then control passes to step 207, where the user of station 110 may elect to make the payment via another payment alternative, and then the method ends (step 215). On the other hand, if each of the determinations (i), (ii), and (iii) results in a determination of “yes” (“Yes” in step 205), then control passes to step 206, where a payment transaction message (e.g., a pacs 008 message) is generated by the debtor FI 111. The payment transaction message includes, for example, a transaction identifier (e.g., a UT-ID generated by an algorithm), a biller's or creditor's name, the biller's account number at the biller's FI (e.g., FI 120), the routing number of the biller's FI (e.g., FI 120), the consumer's name, the payment amount, and a biller remittance identifier (i.e., consumer's account number with the biller) so that the biller can associate the payment with the consumer for posting purposes. Payments made for bills obtained by the consumer may be initiated, where the FI 111 can initiate a payment transaction message for each payment, enabling the consumer to pay bills such as, for example and without limitation, bills for debts owed by the consumer (e.g., user of station 110) to the debtor (e.g., associated with station 121).

In traditional (i.e., non-pseudo-identifier) payment transactions, biller routing numbers are used to determine which biller FI should receive a payment transaction message, and billers' account numbers are used to determine which biller's account at the biller FI should receive the payment, and those numbers, in one example, can be obtained by correlating an identifier of the biller to those numbers maintained in a directory (steps 208, 231). The directory may be included in the ACH network 130 (or value added services 138), in one example embodiment, or in another example, it can be included elsewhere in the system 100, such as at a third party or another element.

As an alternative to traditional payment transactions, the ACH network 130 enables a biller to use a bank account number pseudo-code (BANPC) and a bank routing number pseudo-code (BRNPC) as described below, for an added level of security. Similar functionality also is described in U.S. Pat. Nos. 6,173,272 and 6,317,745, both to Thomas et al. These two patents are hereby incorporated by reference in their entireties, as if set forth fully herein. In the example embodiments herein, the BANPC can be used in effecting credit-only transactions, or both credit and debit transactions.

A BRNPC is an alias for a biller FI's routing number which indicates to the ACH network that a BANPC transaction is present. A BANPC is an account identifier alias for a biller's account number at its biller FI (e.g., FI 120). Each alias also is referred to herein as a “token”. For a BANPC transaction, when an electronic payment is specified to be made by a consumer by way of its FI (e.g., FI 111), instead of using the biller's actual account number and a biller FI's actual routing number (whether obtained in the payment authorization message or obtained from the directory), a BANPC identifier corresponding to that account number and a BRNPC are obtained and inserted by the FI (e.g., FI 111) in the payment transaction message, in step 206 (see also steps 208 and 209). As such, “tokenization” is thereby performed. For security, in one example embodiment, FIs such as FI 111 are provided with BRNPCs and corresponding BANPCs, but not with the biller's actual account and routing numbers. The BANPC and BRNPC collectively protect the biller's banking information and mitigate the opportunity for fraud.

In one example embodiment herein, the BANPC identifier and BRNPC are obtained by the FI 111 by accessing the directory to correlate information identifying the biller (creditor) included in the payment authorization to a corresponding BANPC identifier and BRNPC included in the directory (step 208, 209). (In one example embodiment herein, the information identifying the creditor can be any suitable type of identifier, such as, for example, a name, email address, phone number, or the like). As pointed out above, the directory may be included in the ACH network 130, in one example embodiment, or in another example, it can be included elsewhere in the system 100, such as at a third party or another element.

After step 206 is performed, control passes to step 210 where, in one example embodiment, the network 130 receives the payment transaction from the debtor FI 111 (e.g., in a pacs.008 credit transfer message) and determines whether the transaction is correctly formatted. For example, the network 130 checks the message type of the transaction, and validates the format, syntax, and/or structure of the message. That step can be performed in accordance with any suitable techniques. If it is determined that the message is not properly formatted (“No” in step 211), then control passes to step 216′ which will be described below. If it is determined that the message is properly formatted (“Yes” in step 211), then control passes to step 212 where the network 130 checks to determine whether the message is duplicative of one already received, based on, for example, whether a UT-ID included in the message was already received. If it is determined that the message is duplicative (“Yes” in step 213), then control passes to step 216′, which will be described below. If, on the other hand, the message is determined to not be duplicative (“No” in step 213), then control passes to step 214 where the network 130 checks the message to determine whether it includes valid account and routing numbers (e.g., whether tokens or actual account and routing numbers). If not (“No” in step 215), then control passes to step 216′ which is performed in a manner to be described below. If “Yes” in step 215, then in step 216 the network 130 makes a determination as to whether the debtor FI 111 is enabled for sending payment transactions, and whether the creditor FI 120 is enabled to receive payment transactions. For example, this step can include the network 130 checking a look-up table to determine whether information in the table indicates that those FIs have such respective capabilities.

If the FIs are determined not to be enabled (No” in step 217), then control passes to step 216′ which will be described below. If, on the other hand, the FIs are determined to be enabled (“Yes” in step 217), then the network 130 makes a determination as to whether the debtor FI 111 or creditor FI 120 have been suspended to participate in electronic payment transactions (step 218). If either of those FIs are determined to be suspended (and thus the check is determined not to be successful (“No” in step 219)), then control passes to step 216′. That step 216′ will now be described. In step 216′, the network 130 generates an exception message (e.g., a pacs.002 message) and forwards it to the debtor FI 111, and then, in step 220 the debtor FI 111 responds by processing the exception, whereafter the method then ends in step 215.

If, on the other hand, either of the FIs 111 or 120 is determined not to be suspended (and thus the check is determined to be successful (“Yes” in step 219)), then control passes to step 221 where the network 130 performs various business validations. As an example, the validations can include determining whether the payment amount of the payment transaction is less than a predetermined individual transaction limit of the system 100. If the validation(s) performed in step 221 are determined not to be successful (“No” in step 222), then control passes to step 216′ which is performed in the manner described above.

If the validation(s) performed in step 221 are determined to be successful (“Yes” in step 222), then control passes to step 223 where the network 130 updates a multilateral net settlement position for at least one of the debtor FI 111 and the creditor FI 120. Then, in step 224 the network 130 checks to determine whether a token service is being employed in the payment transaction (i.e., the network 130 detects whether a BANPC transaction or a traditional transaction is present). The presence of a BANPC transaction is detected based on the ACH network comparing the BRNPC of the consumer's payment request to a list of routing numbers designated by the ACH network for BANPC transactions. If no match exists (“No” in step 225), then traditional processing proceeds where the network 130 sends the payment transaction to the creditor FI 120 (step 226) to attempt effecting a payment based on the routing number and account number included in the payment transaction message (a pacs.008 message), whereafter the creditor FI 120 begins processing the payment transaction (step 227). That FI 120 determines whether to accept or reject the payment (step 243) based on predetermined criteria, or whether the payment is pending (e.g., perhaps owing to an anti-fraud, ANIL, or OFAC investigation, etc.). In the case where the payment is rejected (e.g., perhaps a relevant account is closed, a token is not recognized, etc.), the FI 120 assigns a reason for rejecting the payment (step 244) and then sends a status “RJCT” negative ACK (e.g., a pacs.002 message) to the network 110 in step 245. Control then passes to step 230 which performs a tokenizing procedure, and then control passes to step 231′ which will be described below. In the case where the FI 120 determines that the payment is pending in step 243, then in step 246 the FI 120 sends a status “PDNG” (e.g., a pacs.002 message) to the network 110. The pending status message may also be, in one embodiment, an accepted without posting message. Control then passes to step 230 which performs a tokenizing procedure, and control then passes to step 236 which will be described below. In the case where the FI 120 determines that the payment is accepted in step 243, then in step 247 the FI 120 sends a status “ACSP” positive ACK message (e.g., a pacs.002 message) to the network 110. Control then passes to step 230 which performs a tokenizing procedure, and control then passes to step 236 which will be described below. In one example embodiment, the FI 120 also can notify the station 121 of the status of the payment (e.g., via text message, email, an online message or other form of communication) (see step 226′ of FIG. 11).

Referring back again to step 225, a case where token services are determined to have been used in the payment transaction will now be described. If a match is determined to exist in step 225 (i.e., if the routing number is a BRNPC in the list), and thus token services are determined to have been used in the transaction (i.e., “Yes” in step 225), then a BANPC transaction is deemed present and the ACH network 130 in step 228 (and involving step 229) performs a detokenization procedure. In this particular example, the detokenization procedure includes a reversal of the tokenization procedure performed in step 206, and thus includes a translation from the BANPC included in the payment transaction to (1) a biller's account number at their biller FI (e.g., FI 120) and (2) a routing number for the biller's FI (e.g., FI 120). To perform this translation, the ACH network 130 and/or value added services 138, maintains a BANPC database that associates each biller's BANPC with that biller's account number at their FI (e.g., FI 120) and the routing number to the biller's FI (e.g., FI 120). Using the directory (also referred to as a BANPC database, which may be maintained by the ACH network 130 or value added service 138 or another element) and the BANPC included in the payment transaction, the ACH network 130 correlates the BANPC included in the transaction to a corresponding BANPC included in the directory, and to that latter BANPC's associated biller account number and routing number of the biller's FI (e.g., FI 120), in the directory (step 229).

The BANPC's associated biller account number and routing number of the biller's FI (e.g., FI 120) are inserted into the payment transaction, and the BANPC and BRNPC are removed from the transaction. Then the ACH network 130 routes the payment transaction, including the inserted account number and routing number, to the biller's FI (e.g., FI 120) based on the inserted routing number, in step 226. Control then passes to step 227 where the process proceeds in the above described manner. It is noted that, when a payment is accepted (in step 243), the biller FI (e.g., FI 120) posts the credit to the biller's account (corresponding to the biller account number) to complete payment.

In accordance with another example embodiment herein, the above translation (de-tokenization) is performed by a FI, such as FI 111, for at least some payment transactions, instead of by the ACH network 130.

Referring now to step 250, in that step the creditor FI 120 awaits an acknowledgement from the creditor station 121 that it has received the payment (see step 250, and “No” in step 249). In response to receive such an acknowledgement from the creditor station 121 (“Yes” in step 249), the creditor FI 120 forwards a payment acknowledgement message towards the debtor FI 111 and/or the debtor station 110 in step 248, via the network 130. Control then passes to step 230, which tokenizes that message, and control then passes to step 240 which will be described below.

Step 231′ will now be described. In step 231′ the network 130 validates the payment message with reason for rejection to determine that it is in a correct format (e.g., in accordance with pacs.002 schema). Then, in step 232, the network 130 conducts a reversal of the update to the multilateral net settlement position of the debtor FI 111 and/or creditor FI 120 (i.e., a reversal of step 223), and then in step 233 the network 130 updates the status of the payment transaction to indicate that the payment has been rejected. In step 234 the network 130 sends a payment reject message (e.g., pacs.002) to the debtor FI 111, including the reason for the rejection, the message is provided from the FI 111 to the station 110, and then the method then terminates (step 215).

Step 236 will now be described. In step 236, the network 130 validates the (a pacs.002 message) from step 246 or 247 to determine that it is in a correct format (e.g., in accordance with pacs.002 schema). Then, in step 238, the network 130 updates the status of the payment transaction as successful (in the case of step 247) or pending (in the case of step 246). In step 239 the network 130 sends a payment status message (e.g., pacs.002) to the debtor FI 111, indicating that the payment was successful or pending, and control then passes to step 235 where the FI 111 sends a message (e.g., a text message, email, online message or other form of communication) to the user station 110 indicating that the payment was successful or pending. Then the method ends at step 215.

Step 240 will now be described. In one example embodiment, in step 240 the network 130 determines whether a payment acknowledgement (e.g., an ACK message) received by the network 130 from the creditor FI 120 is correctly formatted. For example, the network 130 checks the message type of the transaction, and validates the format, syntax, and/or structure of the ACK message. That step can be performed in accordance with any suitable techniques. Then, in step 241 the network 130 forwards the ACK message to the debtor FI 111, which then responds in step 242 by providing a message to the station 110 indicating that the creditor FI 120 has acknowledged receipt of the payment. The method then ends in step 215.

Time Out and Status Reporting

The system 100 also can perform time out and status report processing. Referring now to FIGS. 3 and 12, the manner in which system time out and status report processing are performed will now be described. The procedure of FIG. 3 includes steps similar to those of FIG. 2 (for convenience, those steps will not be further described), but after sending the payment instruction in step 226, the ACH network 130 determines that it has not received a response (e.g., such as a pacs.002 or remt.001 message) thereto within a predetermined time period (step 252). As a result, control passes to step 232 which is performed in the same manner as described above for FIG. 2, and then, in step 233′, the network 130 updates the status of the payment transaction to “Payment Rejected due to Time-Out”. Thereafter, in step 251 the network 130 forwards a payment status time-out message to the debtor FI 111, which then provides a payment reject message to the debtor station 110 (step 256). The method then terminates in step 215.

According to another example aspect of the present application, a party, such as, for example, a creditor, can request a payment from another party. Referring now to FIG. 4 (and also FIGS. 13 and 14), a method according to this example aspect will now be described.

In step 400 the creditor station 121 sends a request to the creditor FI 120, requesting that payment be made to a creditor associated with the station 121, from another party, such as a party associated with debtor station 110. The creditor FI 120 then generates a request for payment message in step 401. Thereafter, step 402 is performed is the same manner as step 206 of FIG. 2, except that it is performed by the FI 120 to create a request for payment message (also referred to as a “payment request message”) instead of a payment message itself Also, in step 402 tokenization is performed to tokenize an identifier associated with station 110 and/or FI 111, with tokens.

After step 402, step 403 is performed wherein, in one example embodiment, the network 130 receives the payment request message from the creditor FI 120 (e.g., in a pain.013 message) and determines whether the message is correctly formatted. For example, the network 130 checks the message type, and validates the format, syntax, and/or structure of the message. That step can be performed in accordance with any suitable techniques. If it is determined that the message is not properly formatted (“No” in step 404), then control passes to step 411 which will be described below. If it is determined that the message is properly formatted (“Yes” in step 404), then control passes to step 405 where the network 130 checks to determine whether the message is duplicative of one already received, based on, for example, whether a UT-ID included in the message was already received in a previous message. If it is determined that the message is duplicative (“Yes” in step 406), then control passes to step 411, which will be described below. If, on the other hand, the message is determined to not be duplicative (“No” in step 406), then control passes to step 407 where the network 130 checks the message to determine whether it includes valid account and routing numbers for the debtor FI 111, or a valid alias (token). If not (“No” in step 408), then control passes to step 411 which is performed in a manner to be described below. If “Yes” in step 408, then in step 409 the network 130 makes a determination as to whether the debtor FI 111 is enabled for sending payment transactions, and whether the creditor FI 120 is enabled for sending a request for payment. For example, this step can include the network 130 checking a look-up table to determine whether information in the table indicates that those FIs have such respective capabilities.

If the FIs are determined not to be enabled (No” in step 410), then control passes to step 411 which will be described below. If, on the other hand, the FIs are determined to be enabled (“Yes” in step 410), then the network 130 makes a determination as to whether a token service is being employed by the debtor FI 111 (e.g., in one embodiment by checking a look-up table that includes such information) (step 412). In one example embodiment herein that step can be performed like step 224 of FIG. 2, but for the debtor FI 111. If the performance of step 412 results in a determination of “No” (“No” in step 413), then control passes to step 415. In step 415, the network 130 forwards the request for payment (e.g., a pain.013) to the debtor FI 111, and then step 418 is performed in a manner to be described below.

Referring back to step 411, that step includes the network 103 generating an exception message (e.g., a pain.014 message) and providing it to the creditor FI 120. Then, in step 414, the creditor FI 120 receives that message and notifies the creditor station 121 of the message, and then the method ends in step 415′.

Referring back again to step 412, a case where token services are determined to be employed by the debtor FI 111 will now be described. In such a case (“Yes” in step 413), control passes to step 416 where the payment request message is de-tokenized. For example, the ACH network 130 (and/or value added services 138) performs a translation from the BANPC included in the request to (1) a debtor's account number with their debtor FI (e.g., FI 111) and (2) a routing number for the debtor's FI (e.g., FI 111). To perform this translation, the ACH network 130 and/or value added services 138, maintains the BANPC database that associates each debtor's BANPC with that debtor's account number at their FI (e.g., FI 111) and the routing number to the debtor's FI (e.g., FI 111). Using the directory and the BANPC included in the payment request, the BANPC included in the transaction is correlated to a corresponding BANPC included in the directory, and to that latter BANPC's associated account number and routing number of the debtor's FI (e.g., FI 111), in the directory (step 417).

The BANPC's associated account number and routing number of the debtor's FI (e.g., FI 111) are inserted into the payment request, and the BANPC and BRNPC are removed from the request. Then the payment request, including the inserted account number and routing number, is routed to the debtor's FI (e.g., FI 111) based on the inserted routing number, in step 415.

After step 415 the payment request is validated in step 418 to confirm that it is in the correct format (step 418). In the case where the validation is not successful (“No” in step 419), then in step 421 the debtor FI 111 sends a “request for payment rejected” message to the ACH network 130 and control passes to step 422 which will be described below. In the case where the validation performed in step 419 is successful (“Yes” in step 419), then the debtor FI 111 determines whether the debtor associated with the debtor station 110 (or the station itself 110) accepts request for payment messages (step 420). If not (“No” in step 420), then control passes to step 421 which is performed in the above-described manner. If step 420 results in a determination of “Yes” (“Yes” in step 420, then control passes to step 423 where the debtor FI 111 forwards a request for payment message to the debtor station 110, where a decision is made (step 424) to accept or ignore the request for payment message. If it is decided the ignore the message, the method ends in step 425. On the other hand, if the message is accepted (“Yes” in step 424), then the station 110 sends a payment transaction message to the debtor FI 111 requesting that the payment be made. The debtor FI 111 then receives the message (step 426) and adds to the message an indication that the payment transaction is in response to a request for payment message (step 427) (e.g., the indication is added to the UT-ID). Then, in step 428 the debtor FI 111 checks the account of the party associated with the debtor station 110 to determine whether it holds sufficient funds for being able to cover the payment transaction amount indicated in the payment message. Where there are sufficient funds, then in step 429 the FI 111 determines whether the payment can be executed in real time (e.g., whether the receiving institution, such as creditor FI 120, has subscribed to the real time payments service). If it is determined that the payment cannot be executed in real time (“No” in step 430), then the payment can be effected using an alternate routing method (step 431), and the method ends in step 432. If it is determined that the payment can be executed in real time (“Yes” in step 430), then the payment transaction message is sent (e.g., in a pacs.003 message) to the ACH network 130.

Referring now to step 422, the step includes tokenizing the account/routing numbers of the creditor in a similar manner as tokenization is performed in step 206 of FIG. 2. After step 422 for the case where the message was provided from step 430, control passes to step 433 where a credit transfer process is performed. In one example, that process is performed by performing steps that are the same as those starting at step 210 of FIG. 2 (e.g., the process includes all steps of FIG. 2 except for those preceding step 210).

On the other hand, after step 422 for the case where the “request for payment rejected” message is received from debtor FI 111 in step 421 and processed in step 422, control passes to step 434 where, in one example embodiment, the network 130 determines whether the message received from the debtor FI 111 is correctly formatted. For example, the network 130 checks the message type of the transaction, and validates the format, syntax, and/or structure of the message. That step can be performed in accordance with any suitable techniques. Then, in step 435 the network 130 forwards a reject message to the creditor FI 120 and updates a record of the network 130 to indicate that the request for payment message has been rejected. In step 436 the creditor FI 120 receives the reject message and notifies the creditor station 121 that the request for payment has been rejected. The method then ends in step 415′. FIG. 13 also shows steps 400, 402, 415, and 423 described above, in association with steps 202, 206, 226, 234, 235, 239, 245, 246, 247, and 226′ that were described above in connection with FIG. 2. In FIG. 13, step 202 is initiated after the debtor 110 receives a message requesting payment in step 423.

Return of Funds

The method herein provides certainty for receivers. For example, funds are not permitted to be taken back from the receiver. In the case of error, a payer can ability request a return of funds (although in some embodiments there is no obligation to reverse/revoke transaction). This enables parties to complete transactions that would be too risky if payment could be reversed. In one example embodiment, requests for a return of funds refund can require a new transaction to return the funds to the requester, although this example is not limiting.

In example embodiments herein, between a payer and payee, once funds are sent by sender, funds cannot be pulled back without receiver's permission. Between a payer and payer's FI and between a payer's FI and payee's FI, once a payment message is transmitted to the network operator by the sending FI, the message cannot be cancelled or amended. Between a payer's FI and payee's FI, once the payment message is transmitted to the network operator by the sending FI, the sending FI has an obligation to settle the payment (unless receiving FI rejects the payment), and, once settled, the sending FI has no ability to pull back funds, although the receiving FI can reject payment and return funds.

In a credit push scenario, a consumer initiates payment, and, as such, there are no unauthorized debits. Bank are required by regulations to resolve errors related to thefts of account funds, subject to a consumer's responsibility to report the loss or theft of an access device. With respect to errors such as input errors (e.g., transposed account digits), these can be addressed by a process to request the funds from the counterparty and the development of payment features to reduce sending errors.

As an example of a process to request the return of funds sent in error, in one example embodiment, a return can be requested only for a sender error. For example, a receiver may recognize that a payment was made in error, sends a message to the payer that the payment is being returned, the payment is returned to the payer, which recognizes that the payment was made in error. The payer can send a message to the payee indicating that the payment was made in error. The receiver receives the message and can agree to return the funds to the payer. If the receiver does not agree to do so, or otherwise does not send a response, then the payer sends a message via the payer's FI to the receiver's FI asking for the return of funds. All messages reference the universal transaction Id of the original payment.

An example aspect of the present application will now be described, with reference to FIG. 5, which shows a flow diagram for requesting a return of funds. This procedure can be useful where, for example, a debtor has paid a creditor perhaps mistakenly, and desires to obtain a return of the funds. The method commences in step 500, and in step 501 the debtor station 110 communicates with debtor FI 111 to request a return of funds from a creditor, such as that associated with creditor station 121. The debtor FI 111 then generates a request for return of funds message in step 502. Then step 503 is performed in a similar manner as step 206 of FIG. 2, except for the newly generated message. Then step 504 is performed in a similar manner as step 210 of FIG. 2 to determine whether the message is correctly formatted. If the message is not correctly formatted (“No” in step 505), then control passes to step 506 which is performed in the same manner as step 216′ of FIG. 2. If the message is determined to be correctly formatted (“Yes” in step 505), then control passes to step 507 where the network 130 checks to determine whether the message is duplicative of one already received, based on, for example, whether a UT-ID included in the message was already received. If it is determined that the message is duplicative (“Yes” in step 508), then control passes to step 506 which is performed as described above, After step 506 the network 130 sends a notification to the debtor FI 111 indicating that the request for return of funds failed, and that FI notifies the debtor station 110 (step 518). The method then ends in step 519.

If, on the other hand, the message is determined in step 508 to not be duplicative (“No” in step 508), then control passes to step 509 where the network 130 checks the message to determine whether it includes valid account and routing numbers. If not (“No” in step 510), then control passes to step 506 which is performed in the manner described above. If “Yes” in step 510, then in step 511 the network 130 forwards a request for return of funds message to the creditor FI 120, which then validates the message to check that it is correctly formatted (step 512). If the validation is not successful (“No” in step 513), then a message (e.g., a camt.029 message) indicating that result is provided to ACH network 130 and processing continues in step 517 where, in one example embodiment, the network 130 can notify the debtor FI 111 thereof (which can the notify the station 110 of the same). Additional procedures then can be performed as will be further described with respect to FIG. 6 below.

If, on the other hand, the validation in step 513 is successful, then the creditor FI 120 investigates the situation regarding whether or not the funds should be returned (step 514). If it is decided to respond to the request for return of funds (“Yes” in step 515), then control passes to step 517 where, in one example embodiment, the network 130 can notify the debtor FI 111 of the result of the investigation or that one is being undertaken (the FI 11 also can notify the station 110 of the same). The notification also can provide a message returning the amount requested in the request for return of funds message. Additional procedures can then be performed as will be further described with respect to FIG. 6 below. Otherwise, if “No” in step 515, then the method ends in step 516.

FIG. 13 also shows procedures for making payments, including steps 202, 206, 226, 226′, 235, 239, and 247 that were described above in connection with FIG. 2, and procedures for requesting a return of funds, including steps 503, 511, 513, 515, and 517 described above in connection with FIG. 5, wherein the numbers in FIG. 15 are intended to indicate the messages sent in association with those steps.

FIG. 6 will now be described. After receiving a message in step 517, the debtor FI 111 generates in step 606 a response to request for return of funds message (e.g., camt.029). In one example embodiment herein, the response includes a BANPC identifier and BRNPC obtained by the FI 111 by accessing the directory to correlate information included in the message received in step 517 to a corresponding BANPC identifier and BRNPC included in the directory (step 208, 209). That obtaining can be performed in a similar manner as described above in connection with step 206 of FIG. 2, but for the response to request for return of funds message.

After step 606 is performed, control passes to step 610 where, in one example embodiment, the network 130 receives the message generated in step 606 from the debtor FI 111 (e.g., in a camt.029 message) and determines whether the transaction is correctly formatted. For example, the network 130 checks the message type of the transaction, and validates the format, syntax, and/or structure of the message. That step can be performed in accordance with any suitable techniques. If it is determined that the message is not properly formatted (“No” in step 611), then control passes to step 616 which is performed to generate an exception message like in step 506 of FIG. 5. That message is then provided to the debtor FI 111 where it is processed (step 620), and then the method ends in step 615. If it is determined that the message is properly formatted (“Yes” in step 611), then control passes to step 612 where the network 130 checks to determine whether the message is duplicative of one already received, based on, for example, whether a UT-ID included in the message was already received. If it is determined that the message is duplicative (“Yes” in step 613), then control passes to step 616, which will be described below. If, on the other hand, the message is determined to not be duplicative (“No” in step 613), then control passes to step 614 where the network 130 checks the message to determine whether it includes valid account and routing numbers. If not (“No” in step 615), then control passes to step 616 which is performed in a manner to be described below. If “Yes” in step 615, then in step 617 the network 130 sends a response to request for return of funds message to the creditor FI 120, which then can investigate the situation relating to the request and updates the status of the request in accordance with the received message and the investigation (step 618). The method ends in step 620′.

Requests for Information

FIG. 7 will now be described. FIG. 7 shows a flow diagram of a procedure enabling a party, such as, for example, a creditor associated with creditor station 121, to request information from an institution association with another party, such as debtor FI 111 associated with debtor station 110, or with debtor station 110 itself. In step 700 the method commences, and creditor station 121 communicates with creditor FI 120 to request information (step 701). In step 702 the creditor FI 120 receives and enables the request, and then in step 703 generates a request for information message. That request may be in association with a specific, original payment, such as one made in the procedure of FIG. 2. In step 704 the request for information message is assigned a UT-ID and tokenization is performed. Step 704 can be performed like step 402 of FIG. 4, in one example embodiment.

In one example embodiment herein, for tokenization a BANPC identifier and BRNPC are obtained by the FI 120 and included in the message. For example, the FI 120 can access a directory to correlate information (e.g., a bank account and routing number) included in the message to a corresponding BANPC identifier and BRNPC included in the directory (step 209). The directory may be included in the FI 120, ACH network 130, or in another part of the system 100, such as at a third party or another element.

After step 704 is performed, control passes to step 705 where, in one example embodiment, the network 130 receives the message generated in step 704 from the creditor FI 120 (e.g., in a camt.027 message) and determines whether the transaction is correctly formatted. For example, the network 130 checks the message type of the transaction, and validates the format, syntax, and/or structure of the message. That step can be performed in accordance with any suitable techniques. If it is determined that the message is not properly formatted (“No” in step 706), then control passes to step 711 where the ACH network 130 generates an exception message and provides it to the creditor FI 120, which then processes the message and notifies (step 712) the creditor station 121 of the exception message (step 713). The method ends in step 714.

Referring again to steps 705 and 706, if it is determined that the message from step 704 is properly formatted (“Yes” in step 706), then control passes to step 707 where the network 130 checks to determine whether the message is duplicative of one already received, based on, for example, whether a UT-ID included in the message was already received. If it is determined that the message is duplicative (“Yes” in step 708), then control passes to step 711, which is performed as described above. If, on the other hand, the message is determined to not be duplicative (“No” in step 708), then control passes to step 709 where the network 130 checks the message to determine whether it includes valid account and routing numbers. If not (“No” in step 710), then control passes to step 711, which is performed as described above. If “Yes” in step 710, then in step 715 the network 130 sends a request for information message to the debtor FI 111, which then processes the message (step 716) and validates it against predetermined criteria (step 717). The message is then forwarded to the debtor station 110 in step 718, and the debtor station 110 and/or party associated therewith can decide how to address the request for information (step 721). If it is decided to ignore the request, then the method ends in step 722. In the event were the debtor station 110 provides a respond to the request for information, then the debtor FI 111 receives that response (step 719), adds a reference to the message in step 720 to indicate that it is associated with the original request for information message received in step 716, and then control passes through step 723 to FIG. 8, which will be described below.

FIG. 8 will now be described, and represents a continuance of the procedures from step 723 of FIG. 7. In step 806 a response to request for information message (e.g., camt.028) is generated by the debtor FI 111, based on the message accepted in step 719 and reference added in step 720.

Also, in one example embodiment herein, tokenization is performed wherein a BANPC identifier and BRNPC are obtained by the FI 111 by accessing a directory to correlate information included in the response message (e.g., information identifying the requestor of the request for information) to a corresponding BANPC identifier and BRNPC included in the directory (step 209). The directory may be included in the ACH network 130, in one example embodiment, or in another example, it can be included elsewhere in the system 100, such as at FI 111, a third party, or another element. The obtained BANPC and BRNPC are included in the response message generated in step 806.

After step 806 is performed, control passes to step 810 where, in one example embodiment, the network 130 receives the message generated in step 806 from the debtor FI 111 (e.g., in a camt.028 message) and determines whether the transaction is correctly formatted. For example, the network 130 checks the message type of the transaction, and validates the format, syntax, and/or structure of the message. That step can be performed in accordance with any suitable techniques. If it is determined that the message is not properly formatted (“No” in step 811), then control passes to step 816 where the ACH network 130 generates an exception message and provides it to the debtor FI 111, which then processes the message and notifies (step 820) the debtor station 110 of the exception message. The method ends in step 815.

If performance of step 810 results in a determination that the message is properly formatted (“Yes” in step 811), then control passes to step 812 where the network 130 checks to determine whether the message is duplicative of one already received, based on, for example, whether a UT-ID included in the message was already received. If it is determined that the message is duplicative (“Yes” in step 813), then control passes to step 816, which will be described below. If, on the other hand, the message is determined to not be duplicative (“No” in step 813), then control passes to step 814 where the network 130 checks the message to determine whether it includes valid account and routing numbers. If not (“No” in step 815), then control passes to step 816, which is performed in a manner to be described below. If “Yes” in step 815, then in step 817 the network 130 sends a response to request for return of funds message to the creditor FI 120, which then validates that response against predetermined criteria (step 818) and provides it to the creditor station 121 (step 819). The method ends in step 820.

FIG. 16 also shows procedures involved in request for information, in association with those for making payments. For making payment, FIG. 16 further represents steps 202, 206, 226, 226′, 235, 239, and 247 that were described above in connection with FIG. 2. With respect to a request for information, FIG. 16 further represents steps 701, 704, 715, 718, and 721 of FIG. 7, and steps 806, 817, and 818 of FIG. 8, wherein the reference numbers in FIG. 16 are intended to indicate the messages sent in association with those steps.

Providing Remittance Advice

FIG. 9 will now be described, and shows a procedure for sending remittance advice. In step 900 the method commences and control passes to step 901. That step 901 can include a step like step 201 of FIG. 2, wherein debtor station 110 requests that a payment be made (e.g., a pacs.008 message), and then control passes to step 202 of FIG. 2, where procedures for making a payment are performed as described above, beginning with that step. Also in step 901, the debtor station 110 provides remittance advice (step 901) (in a remt.001 message) to the debtor FI 111, which receives it in step 902 and a generates remittance advice message.

In one example embodiment herein, a BANPC identifier and BRNPC are obtained by the FI 111 by accessing a directory to correlate information included in the remittance advice (e.g., information associated with station 121 and/or FI 120) to a corresponding BANPC identifier and BRNPC included in the directory (step 903, 208, 209). The directory may be included in the ACH network 130, in one example embodiment, or in another example, it can be included elsewhere in the system 100, such as at the FI 111, a third party or another element. The obtained identifiers are included in the remittance advice message, as is an assigned UT-ID. Step 903 can be performed like step 206 of FIG. 2, but for the remittance advice message.

After step 903 is performed, control passes to step 904 where, in one example embodiment, the network 130 receives the message generated in step 904 from the debtor FI 111 (e.g., in a remt.001 message) and determines whether the message is correctly formatted. For example, the network 130 checks the message type, and validates the format, syntax, and/or structure of the message. That step can be performed in accordance with any suitable techniques. If it is determined that the message is not properly formatted (“No” in step 905), then control passes to step 916 which will be described below. If it is determined that the message is properly formatted (“Yes” in step 905), then control passes to step 907 where the network 130 checks to determine whether the message is duplicative of one already received, based on, for example, whether a UT-ID included in the message was already received. If it is determined that the message is duplicative (“Yes” in step 908), then control passes to step 916, which will be described below. If, on the other hand, the message is determined to not be duplicative (“No” in step 908), then control passes to step 909 where the network 130 checks the message to determine whether it includes valid account and routing numbers. If not (“No” in step 910), then control passes to step 916, which is performed in a manner to be described below. If “Yes” in step 910, then in step 911 the network 130 determines whether the debtor FI 111 identified in the message has a capability to receive real time payments (i.e., is “real time enabled”) (step 911). If not (“No” in step 912), then control passes to step 916 which is performed in the manner described below. If “Yes” in step 912, then the network 130 makes a determination as to whether the debtor FI 111 or creditor FI 120 have been suspended to participate in electronic payment transactions (step 913). If either of those FIs are determined to be suspended (and thus the check is determined to not be successful) (“No” in step 914), then control passes to step 916. That step 916 will now be described. In step 916, the network 130 generates an exception message (e.g., a NACK message) and forwards it to the debtor FI 111, and then, in step 929 the debtor FI 111 responds by sending the exception message to the debtor station 110 (step 929), whereafter the method then ends in step 930.

If, on the other hand, either of the FIs 111 or 120 is determined not to be suspended (and thus the check is determined to be successful) (“Yes” in step 914), then control passes to step 915 where the network 130 determines whether token services are being employed by the creditor FI 120. If that determination results in a “Yes” decision (“Yes” in step 917), then in step 919 the tokens obtained in step 903 that are aliases of the creditor account and routing numbers are removed from the remittance advice message received from the FI 111 and replaced with their corresponding account and routing numbers (step 919). That step, which can be performed by the value added services 138, in one example embodiment herein, can be performed by invoking a directory (step 920) that may be included in the ACH network 130 or elsewhere in the system 100.

Referring again to steps 915 and 917, if the determination results in a “No” decision (“No” in step 917), then in step 918 the network 130 sends a remittance advice message (e.g., remt.001) to the creditor FI 120, which then processes and validates the message (step 921).

If that message is determined to be valid (“Yes” in step 922) then the remittance advice message is provided to the creditor station 121 (step 923), and then the method ends in step 924. If step 922 results in a determination of “Yes” decision (“Yes” in step 922), then a message indicative thereof (and, in one example, including the remittance advice) is provided by the FI 120 to the value added services 138, and, in step 925 tokenization can be performed by the services 138 to include tokens in the message, corresponding to the debtor FI 111. The inclusion of tokens can be performed in a similar manner as that described above for, by example, step 230 of FIG. 2. The resulting tokenized message is then provided to the network 130 which in step 926 receives the message and determines whether it is correctly formatted. For example, the network 130 checks the message type of the transaction, and validates the format, syntax, and/or structure of the message. That step can be performed in accordance with any suitable techniques. Then in step 927 the network 130 updates a status of the remittance advice to indicate that it is rejected, and sends a remittance status message to the debtor FI 111 (step 928). Thereafter, in step 929 that message is provided to the debtor station 110 and then the method ends (step 930).

FIG. 17 also shows procedures involved in providing remittance advice, in association with those for making payments. For making payment, FIG. 17 further represents steps 202, 206, 226, 226′, 235, 234, 239, 245, 246, and 247 that were described above in connection with FIG. 2. With respect to providing remittance advice, FIG. 17 further represents steps 901, 903, 918, 922, 923, 928, and 929 of FIG. 9, wherein the reference numbers in FIG. 17 are intended to indicate the messages sent in association with those steps.

Payment States

In one example embodiment herein, a payee receives notification of a payment immediately after a payer initiates a transaction, and the payer can receive timely feedback as to the disposition of the payment. This can be useful because it enables the payee to know when a payment has been initiated, and provides an immediate customer experience, even if settlement is done later. Positive notification may serve as proof of payment.

In one example, embodiment, notification can be provided according to a predetermined standard (e.g., always notify a mobile device if available), or the customer can select the method of being notified. Also, the payer can receive immediate notification as to whether the payment was able to be completed immediately, was delayed for review, or was unsuccessful. Notifications preferably include a Universal Transaction Id. Examples of methods of communication with a customer include a text messages, E-mails, online banking website, telephone (e.g., auto dial), etc.

FIG. 10 is a payment state flow diagram which will now be described, according to an example aspect herein. The method starts in step 1000, and in step 1001 a payment message is generated at the debtor FI 111 and forwarded to the ACH network 130 which validates the message in step 1002. For example, the network 130 evaluates the message to determine whether it has a valid message type, whether it includes valid routing information, whether the type of the transaction is supported by the originator FI and/or recipient FI of the message (as identified in the message), whether any of those FIs is suspended from participating in the system 100, whether the various fields in the message include valid information, whether the message complies with business rules, and/or whether the message is a duplicate of one already received. If, based on the evaluation it is determined to reject the payment message (Yes” in step 1002), then in step 1002 a a status of the payment message is recorded by the network 130 as being rejected along with the reason for the rejection, and information indicative thereof is provided to the debtor FI 111 which then records that the payment transaction has been rejected (step 1004). If, based on the evaluation in step 1002 it is determined to not reject the payment message (“No” in step 1002), then the payment message is forwarded to the creditor FI 120 by way of the ACH network 130. If the ACH network 130 does not receive a reply in response thereto within a predetermined time period (1003), then control passes through connector A to step 1013 described below. Otherwise, after the creditor FI 120 receives the message and determines whether to accept or reject it (step 1005) (e.g., based on criteria described above for step 1002). If it is determined to reject the message, then in step 1006 the FI 120 records the status of the message as being rejected and provides an indication thereof to the network 130, which also records the status of the message as being rejected and provides an indication thereof to the FI 111 in step 1007. Step 1004 is then performed as described above. In the case where performance of step 1005 results in an acceptance of the payment message, then in step 1008 the FI 120 records the status of the message as being accepted and provides an indication thereof to the network 130, which also records the status of the message as being accepted and provides an indication thereof to the debtor FI 111 (step 1009). In step 1010 the debtor FI 111 records that the payment message is accepted. In the case where performance of step 1005 results in a determination that the payment transaction is pending owing to, e.g., a fraud investigation or sanctions, then in step 1011 the FI 120 records the status of the message as pending, until that status is removed (step 1012), in which case control passes to step 1008 which is performed in the manner described above. In a case where sanctions are applied in step 1012, then control passes through connector B to step 1006 which is performed as described above. On the other hand, if sanctions are blocked (e.g. funds are seized) after step 1012, step 1008 is performed in the above described manner. Also after step 1011 is performed for a case where an investigation is pending, the creditor FI 120 notifies the network 130 that the payment status is pending owing to the investigation (step 1016), and the network 130 makes a record of the same, and notifies the debtor FI 111, which then updates a status of the payment transaction as pending (step 1017).

Step 1013 will now be described. In step 1013 the network 130 responds to a timeout by performing step 1014 where the network 130 records a status of the payment as having a creditor timeout status and notifies the debtor FI 111 of the same. That FI 111 then records the status of the payment to timeout with a rejection and reason therefor (step 1015).

Exception Message Processing

As described above, the system 100 generates various types of exception messages in the event that an exception type of message is detected. FIG. 18 is a further representation of a procedure for doing so. For example, that drawing shows steps 201, 206, and 216′ as explained above regarding FIG. 2, wherein the exception message generated in step 216′ (e.g., a PACS.002 message) is generated in response to the network 130 detecting a duplicate message (e.g., in step 213 of FIG. 2), and/or an invalid token (e.g., step 214 of FIG. 2), and also shows the debtor FI 111 responding to that exception message by providing notification thereof to the debtor station 110 (step 1800) (e.g., in the form of an email, text message, or other type of communication).

Message Types

In an example embodiment herein, robust messaging capability is provided. The payment system supports multiple financial and non-financial message types which can be used to create a variety of transaction flows in support of disparate use cases, and flexible and extensible message formats are employed that are able to adapt to changing needs. This enables payment system flexibility for future needs, provides a platform for product development and innovation, and allows the system to become backward compatible with a network such as the ACH network 130. Messages may be overlaid to provide end-to-end solutions for specific use cases. Extensible messaging includes both financial and non-financial messages, asymmetric products (framework allows FIs to create products independently for senders and receivers), and, within messages there can be fields of data, external links, etc. Messages employed herein also can comply with existing global standard formats (e.g., ISO 20022, ISO 8583, etc.), and have international compatibility (e.g., multi-currency). Related messages can include a Universal Transaction Id which is unique within the payment system for every payment, as well as an identifier of a sending party (if applicable). Example messages include FI to FI messages such as acknowledgements by a receiver, and payment messages. Example FI to end user messages include receiver notification messages, sender notification messages, payment successful messages, sender notification payment rejected messages, and sender notification payment under review messages. Example end user to end user messages include requests for payment (e.g., invoice or message), receipt acknowledged by receiver messages, request for return of funds messages, and agree to return funds messages. Example third party messages include universal transaction IDs, links to external sources, and contingency payment rule messages. Non-payment messages preferably support value-added services and administration. Related messages can be linked into complex transactions. Messages can carry remittance data and references to external data and processes for extended functionality.

ISO 20022 is a harmonized set of XML messaging standards across major financial services domains (Funds Transfer, Cash, Securities, Trade, Card and Foreign Exchange) based on a shared data dictionary and business process model. Messages are available for the complete end-to-end payments chain; i.e., customer to bank, bank to bank, and reporting. Data definitions can be used as the basis for internal communication needs, and the standard can support real-time messaging (e.g., Denmark NETS).

ISO 8583 is a common interface by which financial transaction card originated messages may be interchanged between acquirers and card issuers. Messages in the standard typically contain information about the value of a transaction, where it originated, the card account number, and bank sort code. Message data fields can be customized, and the standard can support real-time messaging. The standard is used by retail banks, and for almost all credit and debit card transactions, including ATMs.

As described above, and referring now to FIG. 39, the overall system 100 herein employs various types of non-payment, administrative messages, such as messages 3900 exchanged between the debtor FI 111 and system 130, and messages 3902 exchanged between the system 130 and creditor FI 120.

Messages 3900 and 3902 can include, for example, management related information, unsolicited system messages, and settlement related messages. FIGS. 19b and 19d described show at least some administrative types of messages.

FIGS. 19a and 19c are another depiction of the system of FIG. 1, including elements 110, 111, 120, 121, 130, and 120, and FIGS. 19b and 19d shows various messages in columns 1901 and 1903, that are employed in the system according to an example embodiment herein. The types of those messages those messages are indicated in respective columns 1904 and 1905. The “Direction” columns 1900 and 1902 and the numbers shown therein correspond to the same numbers represented in FIG. 19a or 19 c, and the arrows associated with those numbers indicate the direction in which the respective messages travel in the system. The message types under columns 1904 and 1905 also are represented in the various flow diagrams herein. The messages are either, for example, payment messages, value added messages, exception messages, administrative messages, settlement messages, or system messages.

FIGS. 20a-20c show various message types in columns 2000, ISO codes under column 2001, message names under column 2002, definitions of the message types in column 2003, and an indication in column 2004 of whether the message types relate to an FI, network 130, or both, that are employed in the system according to an example embodiment herein. At least some of the message types of those figures correspond to message types represented in FIGS. 19b and 19d . The message types of FIG. 20a-20c are external status reason codes. FIG. 45 shows examples of various types of messages and certain characteristics thereof.

In one example embodiment herein, at least some of the various types of messages employed in the system include at least some of the following types of information:

-   -   Universal Transaction ID (i.e., a payment id),     -   a related message ID (e.g., to manage responses and exception         messaging),     -   sender identification information,     -   designation of a business/commercial transaction versus a         consumer transaction,     -   an indicator of whether a payer wants/accepts a return message         (e.g., an acknowledgement, RFI, etc.),     -   a reject reason code,     -   a loyalty indicator (for merchant loyalty programs, coupons,         match with POS geo location, etc.),     -   a channel indicator (mobile, web, etc.),     -   a fraud suspect indicator,     -   a Dynamic risk score,     -   a currency indication,     -   a location of bank account(s) (sender and receiver),     -   a foreign designator including country of account domicile,     -   a timestamp,     -   a Geo location indication, and     -   payment amount (for payment instruction messages).         Payment instruction messages can include, for example,         remittance fields, and 140 characters, although these examples         are not limiting. Administrative Messages

Non-payment administrative messages can include, by example, the following management messages:

-   -   transaction volume type messages:     -   last message sent, and     -   unsolicited system messages:     -   system outage     -   suspended payments to specific end points     -   settlement related messages     -   settlement cycle started     -   settlement cycle completed     -   settlement cycle outage     -   notice of insufficient funding     -   request for supplemental funding     -   net settlement position     -   potential duplicate message     -   bank indicator to payment system regarding down-time/issues     -   broadcast message(s)—with capability to send to only a subset of         impacted financial institutions     -   summary archival inquiry     -   directory of people at financial institutions     -   unresolved request for payment.     -   management related information:     -   transaction volume     -   unsolicited system messages:     -   system outage.

At least one or more of the following messaging features, types, contents, functions, and characteristics can be employed in the system 100 herein:

-   -   real-time transmission of payment and non-payment messages     -   non-payment messages support value-added services and         administration     -   all messages include a unique reference ID and sender name     -   related messages can be linked into complex transactions     -   messages can carry remittance data and reference to external         data and processes for extended functionality     -   channel indicator (mobile, web, etc.)     -   currency     -   type of account—sender (e.g. DDA, trust, prepaid)     -   foreign payment designator including country of account domicile     -   disclosure requirement indicator (e.g., fee disclosure for         foreign remittances)     -   fraud suspect indicator/dynamic risk score (added by network for         receiving FIs that use centralized fraud suspect service)     -   sender discretionary data (optional).

Bulk Messaging

In an example embodiment herein, bulk messages can be employed. By example, low value, urgent payments can be aggregated and sent together for convenience and efficiency (e.g., this can be useful in scenarios such as payments of temporary employee wages, emergency disbursements, etc.). The bulking functionality can be performed at a FI level at the network 130, or in other elements of the system 100.

Payment Scenario Contexts

The methods and system described herein can be employed to conduct real-time payments in many different scenarios. By example, they can be employed in a business to person context, such as, for example, to pay employee wages, emergency payroll, urgent business to consumer contexts (e.g., disaster relief). Other examples may involve high value ad hoc payments such as large, one-time payments (e.g., insurance claims, legal settlements, etc.), or low value ad hoc payments (e.g., small one-time payments (e.g., temporary employee wages, emergency payroll, etc.)). Payments can be made available within a predetermined amount of time (e.g., within minutes, hours, etc.).

FIG. 21 is an example of an application/scenario for the payment system described herein. In this example, a small business (small market entity) 2100 desires to order goods from a supplier 2102. The supplier 2102, by way of its FI 2103, forwards an electronic invoice 2101 to payment system 2104 (which can include, for example, ACH network 130) which then provides a request for payment message 2105 that, in one example embodiment herein includes a link to the invoice, to a FI 2105′ associated with the small business 2100. In one example embodiment herein, the message 2105 is received at a cash management workstation 2106. In response to the message, the FI 2105′ generates a payment transaction 2108 to pay the amount requested in the invoice 2101 (e.g., the payment transaction 2108 can be generated in response to a request from the buyer 2100 using an online banking platform 2107), and the payment transaction 2108 is provided to the system 2104 and then forwarded to the FI 2103, such as at a real time receivables module 2109. The FI 2105′ also can generate a payment notification 2110 which is provided by way of the system 2104 to a logistics integration module 2111 of FI 2103, which then responds by forwarding an acknowledgement (ACK) message 2112 that, in one example embodiment herein, includes a link to shipping information relating to the purchased items. The message 2112 is provided by way of the system 2104 to the FI 2105, where, in the illustrate example, it is received at a mobile banking alert module 2113, which can then notify the buyer 2100 that the payment was acknowledged.

FIG. 22 shows an example of a hybrid real time payment procedure. That procedure determines whether a receiving FI 2206 is subscribed for participating in the real time payment service, and can involve similar procedures such as those relating to steps 429-431 of FIG. 4. In FIG. 22, a sender 2200 initiates a payment transaction 2201 via a FI 2202, which then provides the transaction 2201 to the payment network 2203 (which can include ACH network 130), which then determines whether a receiving FI 2206 identified in the transaction 2201 has subscribed to real time payments service (e.g., this can be performed by correlating an identifier of the FI included in the transaction 2201 with corresponding information stored in the network 2203 indicating whether the receiving FI 2206 is subscribed). If it is determined that the receiving FI 2206 has subscribed to the service (“Yes” in step 2207), then a real time payment transaction 2204 is provided to the FI 2206. On the other hand, in a case where it is determined that the receiving FI 2206 is not subscribed to the service (“No” in step 2207), then a hybrid option 2208 is performed where the network 2203 communicates a message 2209 to the FI 2202 inquiring as to whether the payment transaction 2201 can be forwarded to the receiving FI 2206 via an alternate payment method. Where such a transaction is approved (e.g., this may occur in response to FI 2202 receiving an approval from sender 2200, which is notified of the query by FI 2202), an approval message 2210 is provided from the FI 2202 to the network 2203, which then provides payment message 2205 to the receiving FI 2206 by the alternate method (e.g., in one example this is performed on the same day as when the payment was initiated, using a conventional ACH transaction).

FIG. 23 represents a business 2300 to person 2302 scenario. FIG. 27 represents another example of a business to person context, such as a case where a payment is made of a temporary employee's wages. For example, a payment request like that described above in connection with step 202 of FIG. 2 is provided from a payer station 110 to FI 111 (step 202), which FI 111 then generates a payment instruction in step 206 and provides it to system 130. The system 130 then provides a payment instruction in step 226 to FI 120, which then can notify payee (or creditor) station 121 of the status of the payment (e.g., via text message, email, an online message or other form of communication) (see step 226′). The station 121 can then acknowledge receipt of that notification (step 249) to the FI 120, which then sends to the debtor FI 111 an indication of the payment status (e.g., a rejection or negative status indication in step 245, a pending status indication in step 246, or an accept status indication in step 247). The system 130 then provides an indication of the status (e.g., a rejection in the case of step 234 or an accepted or pending status in the case of step 239) to the FI 111, which can then send an indication of that status to the debtor station 110 (step 235).

FIG. 40 shows the same elements as those represented in FIG. 27 (for convenience, those elements are not repeated again here), and also represents a process for rejecting a payment instruction. For example, after deciding to reject a payment instruction (such as in the manner described for step 243 of FIG. 2), the creditor FI 120 issues a payment rejected message to the network 130 in step 245, and the network 130 then forwards that message to the debtor FI 111 in step 234.

FIG. 42 shows an example where timeouts are employed with regard to payment instructions. This is example shows a business to person scenario in the context of a payment for temporary employee wages (although of course this example is not limiting). This example includes steps 206 and 226 as described above for FIG. 27. After sending the payment instruction in step 226, the ACH network 130 determines that it has not received a response (e.g., such as a pacs.002 or remt.001 message) thereto within a predetermined time period (see, e.g., step 252 of FIG. 2), and thus detects a timeout. As a result, the network 130 forwards a payment status time-out message to the debtor FI 111 (step 251), which then can provide a payment reject message to the debtor station 110. Also in response to detecting the timeout, the network 130 sends a system cancel (timeout) message to the creditor FI 120 (step 4200), which then sends back an acknowledgement of that message to the network 130 in step 4202.

FIG. 29 is another example representation of a business to person scenario, such as, for example, an urgent disaster relief payment process. FIG. 29 shows the same steps as those described above for FIG. 27 (although for convenience they are not further repeated here) for making a payment. In addition, the figure represents that payee station 121 can optionally provide an acknowledgement to the system 130, indicating that the payment instruction provided in step 226 was received (step 248). The system 130 then provides the acknowledgement to the debtor station 110 in step 241. Steps 241 and 248 are like those of FIG. 2.

As another example, the methods and system described herein can be employed to conduct real-time payments in a person to person context. By example only, they can be employed to effect non-commerce payments (e.g., rent payments to a roommate, emergency funds for a family member, etc.), to perform urgent Account-to-Account transfers (e.g., to fund investments or purchases), to pay for informal services (e.g., babysitting, lawn care, etc.), and the like. Payments can be made available within a predetermined amount of time (e.g., within seconds, minutes, etc.). FIG. 24 represents a person 2400 to person 2402 scenario. FIG. 28 also represents a person to person context for non-commerce payments, and shows the same steps as those described above for FIG. 27 (although for convenience they are not further repeated here) for making a payment, but in a person to person context. In addition, the figure represents that payee station 121 can optionally request that the payment be paid, in which case a request for payment is provided from creditor FI 120 to system 130 in step 402, and the system 130 responds by providing a corresponding request for payment to the debtor FI 111 in step 415. Steps 402 and 415 are like those of FIG. 4. Also, the payee station 121 can optionally request information (e.g., inquiring as to an invoice, or the purpose of a payment, etc.), in which case a request for information is provided from creditor FI 120 to system 130 in step 704, and the system 130 responds by providing a corresponding request for information to the debtor FI 111 in step 715. Steps 704 and 715 are like those of FIG. 7. The debtor FI 111 then can provide the requested information in a response in step 806, to the system 130 (step 806), and the system 130 can then provide the information to the creditor FI 120 in step 817. Steps 806 and 817 are like those of FIG. 8.

FIG. 30 represents a further example of a person to person context, such as a case where an urgent account-to-account payment is made. For example, a payment request like that described above in connection with step 202 of FIG. 2 is provided from a payer station 110 to FI 111 (step 202), which FI 111 then generates a payment instruction in step 206 and provides it to system 130. The system 130 then provides a payment instruction in step 226 to FI 120, which then can notify payee (or creditor) station 121 of the status of the payment (e.g., via text message, email, an online message or other form of communication) (see step 226′). The station 121 can then acknowledge receipt of that notification (step 249) to the FI 120, which then sends to the system 130 an indication of the payment status (e.g., a rejection or negative status indication in step 245, a pending status indication in step 246, or an accept status indication in step 247). The system 130 then provides an indication of the status (e.g., a rejection in the case of step 234 or an accepted or pending status in the case of step 239) to the FI 111, which can then send an indication of that status to the debtor station 110 (step 235).

FIG. 32 represents still a further person to person context, such as for payment for an informal service. FIG. 32 shows the same steps as those described above for FIG. 27 (although for convenience they are not further repeated here) for making a payment, but in a person to person context. In addition, the figure represents that payee station 121 can optionally request that the payment be paid, in which case a request for payment is provided from creditor FI 120 to system 130 in step 402, and the system 130 responds by providing a corresponding request for payment to the debtor FI 111 in step 415. Steps 402 and 415 are like those of FIG. 4. Also, the FI 120 can optionally provide an acknowledgement that the payment was received, to the system 130, in step 248, wherein the system 130 can then provide the acknowledgement to the FI 111 in step 241. Steps 241 and 248 are like those of FIG. 2.

As another example, the methods and system described herein can be employed to conduct real-time payments in a person to business context. By example only, they can be employed to conduct immediate bill payments with acknowledgments or receipts, to perform e-commerce purchases, and the like. Payments in this context may be time critical, such as, for example, stock purchases, emergency bill payments, etc. Payments can be made available within a predetermined amount of time (e.g., within seconds, minutes, or hours, etc.). FIG. 25 represents a person to business scenario.

FIG. 33 represents a person to business context, such as for an immediate bill payment. FIG. 33 shows the same steps as those described above for FIG. 27 (although for convenience they are not further repeated here) for making a payment, but in a person to business context. In addition, the figure represents that the FI 120 can optionally provide an acknowledgement that the payment was received, to the system 130, in step 248, wherein the system 130 can then provide the acknowledgement to the FI 111 in step 241. Steps 241 and 248 are like those of FIG. 2. Also, the payee station 121 can optionally request information, in which case a request for information is provided from creditor FI 120 to system 130 in step 704, and the system 130 responds by providing a corresponding request for information to the debtor FI 111 in step 715. Steps 704 and 715 are like those of FIG. 7. The debtor FI 111 then can provide the requested information in a response in step 806, to the system 130 (step 806), and the system 130 can then provide the information to the creditor FI 120 in step 817. Steps 806 and 817 are like those of FIG. 8.

FIG. 41 represents another person to business context, such as for an e-commerce payment. FIG. 41 shows the same steps as those described above for FIG. 33 (although for convenience they are not further repeated here) for making a payment. In addition, the figure represents that the creditor FI 120 can provide fulfillment advice to the system 130 (step 4102), and the system 130 can then provide that advice to the debtor FI 111 in step 4100.

In still a further example, the methods and system described herein can be employed to conduct real-time payments in a business to business context. By example only, they can be employed to effect just in time payments to suppliers, to perform immediate bill payments with acknowledgments of receipt, and the like. Payments in this context may be time critical one time payments between businesses, such as, for example, just-in-time supplier payments, emergency bill payments, etc. Payments can be made available within a predetermined amount of time (e.g., within minutes). FIG. 26 represents a business to business scenario.

FIG. 34 represents a business to business scenario, such as a just in time payment to a supplier. FIG. 34 shows the same steps as those described above for FIG. 27 (although for convenience they are not further repeated here) for making a payment, but in a business to business context. In addition, the figure represents that payee station 121 can optionally request that the payment be paid, in which case a request for payment is provided from creditor FI 120 to system 130 in step 402, and the system 130 responds by providing a corresponding request for payment to the debtor FI 111 in step 415. Steps 402 and 415 are like those of FIG. 4. Also, the debtor station 110 can optionally provide remittance advice to the system 130 in step 903, and remittance location advice to the system 130 in step 3400. The system 130 forwards remittance advice to the FI 120 in step 918, and also can forward the remittance location advice to the FI 120 in step 3402. Steps 903 and 918 are like those of FIG. 9. Additionally, the creditor FI 120 can provide an acknowledgement of any of the payment, the remittance advice, and/or the remittance location advice, to the system 130 in step 248, in which case the acknowledgement is provided by system 130 to FI 111 (step 241). Steps 241 and 248 are like those of FIG. 2.

FIG. 35 represents a business to business context, such as for an immediate bill payment. FIG. 35 shows the same steps as those described above for FIG. 27 (although for convenience they are not further repeated here) for making a payment, but in a business to business context. In addition, the figure represents that the FI 120 can optionally provide an acknowledgement that the payment was received, to the system 130, in step 248, wherein the system 130 can then provide the acknowledgement to the FI 111 in step 241. Steps 241 and 248 are like those of FIG. 2. Also, the payee station 121 can optionally request information, in which case a request for information is provided from creditor FI 120 to system 130 in step 704, and the system 130 responds by providing a corresponding request for information to the debtor FI 111 in step 715. Steps 704 and 715 are like those of FIG. 7. The debtor FI 111 then can provide the requested information in a response in step 806, to the system 130 (step 806), and the system 130 can then provide the information to the creditor FI 120 in step 817. Steps 806 and 817 are like those of FIG. 8. Also, in addition, the figure represents that payee station 121 can optionally request that the payment be paid, in which case a request for payment is provided from creditor FI 120 to system 130 in step 402, and the system 130 responds by providing a corresponding request for payment to the debtor FI 111 in step 415. Steps 402 and 415 are like those of FIG. 4.

The system has many additional capabilities, such as those described herein above and others as well. For example, the system 100 herein also can employ anti-spam measures to prevent the sender from broadcasting a massive number of requests to dupe receivers into sending funds. For example, this can be accomplished by charging a fee for all requests for payments. Also, in one example embodiment herein, a sending or receiving FI can be made liable for information in remittance data that may indicate illegal activity (e.g., the remittance data mentions a sanctioned individual or company). Provided that the payment is not being sent or received by a person or entity on an OFAC list, the FI would not be required to block or reject the transaction under OFAC requirements, in one example. The FI may, however, be required to file a suspicious activity report within 30 days if the content of a message indicates a potential relationship to illicit activity.

As another example capability of the system 100, as described above, in one example embodiment it has a capability for returning funds that were paid. Referring to FIG. 36, for example, the same steps as those described above for FIG. 27 (although for convenience they are not further repeated here) for making a payment. A return of funds can be requested by the debtor FI 111 to the system 130 (step 503), which requests a return of funds from the creditor FI 120 in step 511. Steps 503 and 511 are like those steps of FIG. 5. The FI 120 can then respond by providing a response to the request in step 606, wherein the response can include the requested funds, a status, and/or an acknowledgement of the request. The response is then provided from the system 130 to the debtor FI 111 in step 617. Also, the creditor FI 120 can provide a return of the requested funds optionally in a separate payment instruction message in step 3602, to the system 130, which then provides the message to the debtor FI 111 in step 3600. In addition, the figure represents that the FI 111 can optionally provide an indication of the status of whether that message was accepted, rejected, or is pending (step 3604), to the system 130, which then provides the indication to the creditor FI 120 in step 3606.

Also, as described above in connection with various flow diagrams, duplicate transactions are detected so they are prevented from being fully processed. FIG. 37 represents an example of such a scenario, wherein the same steps as those described above for FIG. 27 (although for convenience they are not further repeated here) are performed for making a payment. The system 130 responds to receiving a payment instruction sent in step 206 by recognizing that it is a possible duplicate transaction (e.g., such as in steps 212 and 213 of FIG. 2), and forwards an indication to the debtor FI 111 indicative of that detection (step 216′). The debtor FI 111 can then reexamine the transaction, and, if it is determined that the original payment instruction is not duplicative, then the FI 111 can forward another payment instruction (see, e.g., a second instance of step 206 shown in dashed lines), whereafter the method then proceeds therefrom as described above.

Also as described above in connection with various flow diagrams, invalid tokens are detected. FIG. 38 represents an example of such a scenario, wherein the same steps as those described above for FIG. 27 (although for convenience they are not further repeated here) are performed for making a payment. The system 130 responds to receiving a payment instruction sent in step 206 by determining whether the instruction includes invalid token(s). For example, that determination can be performed in accordance with steps 214 and 215 of FIG. 2). Where the token(s) is determined to be invalid, then a status message indicating that the token(s) is not valid is provided by the system 130 to FI 111 in step 3800. In one example embodiment, step 3800 can be the same as the exception message step 216′ of FIG. 2. The debtor FI 111 can then reexamine the transaction, and include a valid token(s) in another payment instruction (see, e.g., a second instance of step 206 shown in dashed lines), whereafter the method then proceeds therefrom as described above.

Fraud Detection

Still another capability of the system herein is fraud detection. FIG. 31 represents an example of such a scenario, wherein the same steps as those described above for FIG. 27 (although for convenience they are not further repeated here) are performed for making a payment. The system 130 responds to receiving a payment instruction sent in step 206 (solid line) by determining whether the instruction is possibly fraudulent. For example, that determination can be performed in accordance with any suitable technique for detecting a fraudulent transaction. Where the payment instruction is determined to be possibly fraudulent, then a status message indicating that the transaction is questionable token(s) is provided by the system 130 to FI 111 in step 3100. The debtor FI 111 can then reexamine the transaction, and can send another payment instruction (see, e.g., a second instance of step 206 shown in dashed lines), such as in a case where the FI 111 determines that the original transaction was not fraudulent. The method then proceeds as described above.

Thus, fraud detection can be performed at a central facility, such as at the system (network) 130, which is in a unique position within the overall system 100 to be able to detect activity between sending and receiving points. For example, the system 130 can evaluate transactions passing therethrough to detect predetermined patterns indicative of possible fraud, in real-time, and can then notify the FIs about the possible fraud so that they can take this into account when, for example, running their own fraud algorithms. The determination can involve a heuristic model, in one example embodiment herein, although other models may be used instead. As an example of a fraud detection, the system 130 can recognize that a single recipient is being sent payment transactions from multiple senders, and that a single sender is sending payment transactions to multiple recipients. If those activities are recognized by the system 130 as being indicative of possible fraudulent activity, then the system 130 can take action such as suspending the transaction and notifying FIs in real-time in the above-described manner.

Real-Time Payments are Useful to Customers

The system 100 is convenient in that it can enable consumers to pay each other directly from their existing accounts using online or mobile banking platforms. The system maintains account data privacy and is easy to use. For example, the system can route payments based on tokens that, in one example, are not used to debit accounts, so that senders and receivers will not need to provide complex, sensitive bank account details to other parties. The system also provides cost savings in that it provides a less costly alternative to costly funds transfers, check cashing services and last-minute bill payments. Additionally, the system provides certainty in that senders and receivers can be provided with immediate notifications of payment, and risks of returned payments are reduced because sending financial institutions can immediately verify sufficient funds. The system also is safe in that sending and receiving financial institutions, which have existing relationships with their customers, are responsible for authentication, in one example embodiment herein. Moreover, the system provides for effective cash management in that is has the ability to send and receive payments immediately, giving customers more control over cash flow, which can be useful for cash-constrained small businesses and consumers.

The system herein also supports superior and safer P2P payments, and provides comprehensive digital payment capability. In the system herein, customers can use their existing bank accounts to send and receive payments, whereas other types of non-bank MSP providers typically require customers to establish new accounts, which can be inconvenient during enrollment. Customers of the system herein can fund directly from their bank accounts, without requiring the sharing of sensitive data to payment recipients and recipient banks. For customers of typical non-bank MSP providers, on the other hand, customers must provide banking credentials, and MSP verification must be effected via, for example, a bank website or payment system. With regard to initiating payments, customers can use their existing bank login information, and bank verification/identification are employed for security, according to one example embodiment herein. For typical non-bank MSP providers, on the other hand, a customer must establish a separate login for MSP payment initiation. As for clearing and settlement, in one example embodiment of the system herein, immediate debit and push credit with real time availability to the payment receiver are provided, essentially in all cases. For typical non-bank MSP providers, on the other hand, a debit card or use of an ACH network may be required to effect external payments. Also, no cash outs are required in the system herein, since funds are transferred directly and immediately to a customer's bank account, whereas in typical MSP systems, customers must pull funds from the MSP account into their bank account, which can take a day or longer to be effected.

Sample Business Requirements

In one example embodiment herein, the system complies with predetermined business requirements. For example, with respect to credit transfers, in one example embodiment all payments originated by a payer are not permitted to be taken back from the receiver, and instead the payer can request the return of a payment made in error. This provides payment certainty for receivers.

The real time payment system herein can provide for 24/7 payments, provides real time access to payment status information for both senders and receivers, and immediate availability of funds for receivers. In one example embodiment herein, one of the business rules is that receiving FIs must be able to accept or reject most payments in seconds, and to resolve exceptions flagged for risk management and compliance review within a reasonable time (e.g., 2 hours). Also, receivers are to have access to funds for accepted payments substantially immediately (i.e., no holds).

Other example business requirements are that there is real time exchange of financial and non-financial messages that support a variety of use cases (i.e., messages are in real time), alias routing (e.g., tokens) is preferably employed (although not necessarily required) to initiate payments instead of account numbers. Also, ISO standard formats and internationally consistent transaction flows preferably are employed, to provide global compatibility, and messages must include all relevant data for risk management and compliance. This supports anti-fraud, anti-money laundering and OFAC/sanctions compliance processes.

For safety, additional business requirements can be employed. For example, in one example there is a system-wide limit on transaction sizes, and sending FIs can set lower limits. A settlement approach that mitigates material risk of loss can be employed. Intra-day net settlement and the use of position limits and pre-funding reduce settlement risk. Additionally, as described above, tokenization of bank account numbers protects account data. FIs that cannot meet a threshold for initiating payments may be able to participate as “receive-only” FIs. Thus, in one example a minimum threshold of security and privacy protection can be required of participating FIs.

In one example embodiment herein, there are certain payment system requirements for participants. For example, participating FIs should have functionality supported by the IT infrastructure of the payment system, and there can be certain operating rules and procedures as well. For example, requirements can be placed on participants in the real-time payment system that are not directly implemented by the IT infrastructure of the payment system. This can be in the form of policies, rules, standards, and service level agreements implemented through payment system governance.

In one example herein, FIs can be required to operate on a 24/7/365 basis, to accept and reject payments automatically on that basis, and to have the ability to perform necessary risk management and compliance functions, such as customer authentication, authorization, regulatory compliance screening, and anti-fraud screening 24/7 (which may be automated or outsourced). FIs also can be required to provide real-time access to payment status information for senders and receivers, so that senders and receivers can have complete, timely information about the status of real-time payments.

FIs also can be required to accept or reject a majority of payments (e.g., 95%+) within seconds, and all payments in a reasonable time, and to make immediate notification of payment to senders and receivers, or provide a channel for senders and receivers to inquire about payment status and receive an immediate response. FIs can be required to integrate accurate real-time payment status inquiry, notification, and feedback into online and mobile banking services.

Receiving FIs can be required to provide immediate availability of funds to recipients on a 24/7/365 basis, or at least make funds available to receivers within seconds for any accepted payment. Payments can be rejected for risk management, or an inability to post or legal compliance. Payments may be held for review for a reasonable time only when necessary for risk management and legal compliance purposes, and after review FIs must accept or reject payments, not withhold availability, in one example requirement.

FIs also can be required to employ limits on transaction value, which can be updated periodically based on objective criteria. Policies and processes can be provided to set sender FI value limits for transactions and to apply them to payment origination, and risk management policies and processes can be employed to accept payments up to a system-wide transaction value limit. FIs can be required to have an ability to identify potential structuring of transactions to avoid transaction limits.

Sending FIs can be required to have policies and processes for handling customer claims for unauthorized transfers and funds sent in error, and receiving FI can be required to have policies and processes for responding to requests to reclaim funds sent in error, and FIs can be required to have processes to request a return of erroneous payments, and an inter-FI process including electronic messaging to support requests for return of funds sent in error.

FIs can be required to create and operate a token vault or outsource it to a third party, integrate tokenization into products and services, and educate customers on tokenization. FIs can be required to have an ability to initiate payments based on an alias instead of an account numbers, and enable senders to initiate payments using an alias for the receiver such as a telephone number or email address, or the like.

FIs can be required to have an approach that mitigates material risk of loss, and a settlement process and legal framework that reduce or eliminate potential for settlement failure. FIs can be required to monitor, manage, and fund settlement pools or net settlement across all settlement windows, develop a process to respond to situations where settlement exposure has reached its limit, use tokens to protect account data, such as a unique code in lieu of an account number that cannot be used to debit the account.

For participating FIs, most security and data protection requirements apply across channels and products, not to a specific payment system, in one example embodiment herein. FIs also can be required to support risk management and regulatory compliance, and to support anti-fraud, anti-money laundering, and OFAC/sanctions compliance processes.

There also may be certain requirements placed on FIs such as, for example, practices and procedures for financial institutions participating in the real-time payment system that are not dictated by payment system requirements and operating rules.

Also in one example embodiment herein, there may be certain operator requirements placed on an operator of the core payments system, above and beyond day to day operation and maintenance of the IT infrastructure of the payment system, such as operator policies and procedures. An operator can be, for example, an entity responsible for operating the system 100, a subset thereof, or the network 100.

An operator can be required to establish limits on the value of transactions cleared through the payment system 100, and rules for a process for revising the transaction value limits (sending FIs can set lower value limits for their customers, and receiving FIs cannot set a transaction limit lower than the system-wide limit, in one example. In one example, there is a $25,000 per transaction initial limit, which can be raised over time.

An operator also can be required to provide data collection and reporting to support future value limit revisions, provide rules and procedures establishing a legal basis for payment finality (e.g., rules do not provide a basis for sending FIs to reclaim funds from receiving FIs for unauthorized payments (only sending FI has obligation to verify payment authorization, in one example)).

An operator can be required to support FI processes that prevent errors in sending payments, and for the transmission of messages requesting a return of funds and responses to such requests. An operator can be required to provide utilities to reduce sending errors (e.g., duplicate checking), operate inter-FI settlement, and establish and manage exposure limits for participating FIs.

An operator also can be required to act as a token services provider (TSP), and support third-party token vaults and FIs acting as their own token vaults, or work with a third party service to do so. An operator can be required also to provide centralized fraud and AML monitoring to complement processes at participating FIs. Additionally, an operator can be required to coordinate with international standards groups and payment system operators in other countries to ensure compatibility with the system 100, and to provide immediate transmission of payment status messages, and real-time access to payment status information to FIs. An operator also can be required to provide centralized fraud and AML monitoring to support receiving FI decision-making.

The network 130 also can have various capabilities, in example embodiments herein. For example, the system can support for frequent intraday net settlement, including evening and weekend settlement, and have an ability to apply limits on settlement exposure on an individual FI basis, including the ability to reject or suspend payments submitted by FIs that have reached their limit, and notify FIs that are approaching limits.

The network 130 also can have an ability to administer a pre-funded settlement pool, an ability to process and route tokenized payments and other messages, and an ability to route payments based on either alias or RT/Account Number. The network 130 also in one example can support any type of character-based alias (not just a telephone number of email address), and have an ability to accommodate an alias registry, registry maintenance, and unambiguous routing for multi-owner accounts and multi-account owners.

The network 130, in one example, also meets standards for data security and privacy protection appropriate for a retail payment market utility, has an ability to reject transactions that exceed a system-wide limit on the value of transactions, an ability to change the value limit, and an ability to establish different limits by type of payment.

Moreover, the network 130 can employ message formats that carry all data required for regulatory compliance, and employ tokenization in a manner that does not obscure data required for risk management and compliance such as anti-fraud, anti-money laundering, and OFAC/sanctions compliance. Message formats and processes can be globally compatible, and in one example are in accordance ISO 20022 message formats. The network 130 also can support real-time delivery of payment status information to and from FIs, including payment messages, and ACK/NAC and disposition messages (success, fail or pending).

Also, various elements of the system 100 may be required, in one example herein, to comply with certain business rules for real-time exchange of financial and non-financial messages that support a variety of use cases. For example, sending FIs can be required to adhere to standard formats and usage rules for payment and non-payment messages, receiving FIs can be required to make all relevant information from payment and non-payment messages available to receivers, and receiving FIs can be required to act on administrative messages. FIs also can be required to create products, services and processes to create, deliver, and respond to payment, non-payment, and administrative messages.

Security

The system herein has robust security capability that limits the ability to initiate payments, non-payment messages, and access to data to only authorized persons or applications. This reduces exposure to fraud or data breaches, and prevents incidents that undermine trust in the payments system. Security can be multi-factor, multi-layered security for immediate payments, and any participating FI should meet minimum access standards based on industry standard security principles.

Preferably, the system herein has mechanisms that limit the ability of unauthorized persons or applications to initiate payments, non-payment messages, and access data, so as to reduce exposure to fraud or data breaches. This can prevent incidents that undermine trust in the payments system. In one example embodiment herein, multi-factor, multi-layered security is provided to protect immediate payments, participating FIs meet minimum access standards based on industry standard security principles. Authentication and payment authorization can be provided. Authentication verifies that a payer is an actual authentic payer and has access to account. Payment authorization verifies that authenticated payer is making a true payment, and provides non-repudiation protection for FIs. Existing authentication standards can be employed, such as, for example, FFIEC guidelines, OCC guidelines, NIST CyberSecurity Framework and various standards, or FISMA. Assessments and certifications also can be employed, such as, for example, SOC1/SOC2 assessments, shared assessment SIG & AUP, ISO27001 certifications, SSAE16 certifications, penetration tests and 3rd party attestations. Authorization ensures that sending financial institutions have taken adequate measures to ensure that every payment submitted to the real-time payment system is duly authorized by an authenticated customer. Authentication provides verification that a payer is whom they claim to be and should have access to an account, and can include multi-factor authentication with secure tokens, or other automated fraud management.

Threats and countermeasures are constantly evolving. As such, it is possible that a static standard may become obsolete. Thus, security involves more than just payments initiation. For example, in a credit push system, the sender's financial institution may be required to verify the identity of the sender. Typically, a sender's FI (particularly in a credit puh scenario) is in the best position to verify a sender's identity because of the existing relationship therebetween and “know your customer” obligations. A sending FI generally bears possible liability for unauthorized transactions and therefore has an incentive to employ effective online and mobile banking security.

According to an example embodiment herein, participating FIs should meet a minimum level of security and privacy protection appropriate for a retail payment market utility. The payment system may include FIs that receive but do not send payments.

The system also can have certain operating rules and procedures, such as, for example, rules that reference external security and privacy standards, rules requiring that all FIs meet data protection standards, and that sending FIs meet rigorous standards for sender authentication and payment authorization. Compliance with security and privacy standards preferably is auditable and audited. Security standards do not unnecessarily restrict usability.

With respect to operator requirements, an operator may be required to administer compliance with security and privacy requirements, and, with regard to financial institutions, security and data protection requirements may apply across channels and products, not to a specific payment system.

Tiered Approach to Minimum Requirements Based on Participation

Not all financial initiations may wish to participate in real-time payments at the same level (i.e., some will send and receive real-time payments, while others will only receive). Some institutions will carry greater inherent risk due to participation and volume of payments. In one example embodiment herein, a tiered approach is employed that matches minimum level of requirements with potential for risk within the system. For example, a Tier 2 involves large financial institutions with substantial volume and participating as a sender, and a tier 1 involves small and midsize financial institutions with low to moderate volume and participating as a sender. All Participants in the system may not be sending real-time payments, but may have the capability to receive payments. Tier 2 has a higher level of security, tier 1 has a next, lesser level of security, and the remaining participants may have a lesser level of security.

Minimum requirements for risk control will be associated with the activities that a financial institution is offering and be additive in nature for each increasing level of potential risk. The centralized utility analyzes network level data to identify and report potential fraudulent behavior (e.g., detect anomalous send/receive activity; excessive complaints, etc.). Participating financial institutions should comply with FFIEC guidelines as applied through prudential regulator examination, and to report fraudulent behavior to the operator of the network 130 and/or the sending financial institutions. Participating institutions also should be able to react to alerts from the centralized activity monitoring utility. Participating financial institutions that also send payments also should comply with requirements for all participating financial institutions, have at least a two factor authentication, require registration of customers sending payments, and be able to perform real-time fraud and risk screening for payments being originated. Participating financial institutions that allow customers to make requests for payment should comply with requirements for all participating sending and receiving financial institutions, make warranties and representations that requests for payment are for legitimate purposes, screen and monitor requests for payment initiators, with the ability to identify abusive or fraudulent use, and take corrective actions including suspension of initiator access to the network. Such institutions also should be able to respond to network reports of abuse of requests for payment.

Participating financial institutions that allow for third party payments should comply with requirements for all participating sending and receiving financial institutions that allow customers to initiate requests for payment, make warranties and representations that the third party is abiding by rules for payment origination, apply the same requirements to third party payment services that are applied to financial institutions that send real-time payments and allow requests for payment. Such institutions also should follow FFIEC guidelines regarding third party relationships. The network 130 has an ability to enforce rules against FIs and third parties, including an ability to levy fines and suspend activity on the network. FIs should not allow third parties to originate volume greater than their financial resources can support in the case of third party failure.

Minimum Requirements for all Participating Financial Institutions

Any institution that participates in the system may comply with the following requirements:

1. The organization complies with the following end user authentication requirements: FFIEC guidelines including authentication guidance published in 2005: http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication_guidance.pdf and it's supplement published in 2011: http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/auth-its-final%206-22-11%20(ffiec%20formated).pdf

2. The organization may have 3rd party attestation by having penetration test on an annual basis of their customer authentication platform.

3. The organization may have “Opportunistic TLS” enabled for email communication over the Internet.

Tier 1 Financial Institution Minimum Requirements

In addition to the requirements for all participants in the system, any Tier 1 participants also can be required to meet the following incremental requirements:

1. The organization must have SOC1 and/or SOC2 and/or Shared Assessment AUP and/or ISO27001 certification and/or SSAE16 certification along with penetration test and FFIEC compliance on an annual basis of their customer authentication platform.

2. The organization will retain authentication logs for users who authenticate through their environment prior to acting as sender for at least 60 days.

Tier 2 Financial Institution Minimum Requirements

In addition to the requirements for all participants in the system and Tier 1 requirements, any Tier 2 participants can be required to meet the following incremental requirements:

1. Proof that periodic vulnerability scan is performed on the customer authentication platform.

2. Proof that a SDLC process exists where static and dynamic code analysis is performed on the customer authentication application.

Support for Risk Management and Regulatory Compliance

In one example herein, support for anti-fraud, anti-money laundering and OFAC/sanctions compliance process is provided. For example, payment system requirements may be such that a message format carry all data required for regulatory compliance, and tokenization may be required to not obscure data required for risk management and compliance such as anti-fraud, anti-money laundering and OFAC/sanctions compliance process. Operating rules and procedures may require that a sending FI provide data required for regulatory compliance by a receiving FI, and operator requirements may provide centralized fraud and AML monitoring to complement processes at participating FIs. Moreover, financial institutions may be required to establish policies and processes to obtain data required for regulatory compliance in the payment initiation process, and automated anti-fraud screening may be required to meet expectation to accept or reject payments in seconds or minutes.

Fraud Prevention and Mitigation

Various types of fraud may happen in a credit push system, such as, for example, an account take over, money mule operations, fraudulently inserted payments, fraudulent solicitations (e.g., spam, phishing, credential stealing malware etc.), or other types of fraud. Fraud detection can be provided at the ACH network, financial institutions, and/or third party processors, and can occur in flight/real time, by post hock analysis and detection, or by holding transaction/message records for analysis.

In one example embodiment herein, anti-fraud functions are performed centrally, such as at the ACH network 130. The network 130 can process data that is central in the system, versus at end points (sending and receiving financial institutions). Patterns of activity that are not apparent at an end point (e.g., money mule operations, network fraud schemes, etc.), can be detected. The network 130 also can be a centralized utility that provides offerings for financial institutions that choose not to perform complete anti-fraud in house, and can perform analytics/business intelligence to support fraud prevention.

Security and Fraud Mitigation

Security and risk management requirements are associated with specific real-time payment activities, such as receiving real-time payments, sending real-time payments, allowing customers to send request for payment messages, providing access to third party payment service providers to send real-time payment, and providing a real-time payment directory service. With the exception of receiving real-time payment, there is no existing framework that can be utilized to define all security requirements for financial institutions offering that service. As such, there is a need to establish a governance process for creating, maintaining, updating, monitoring, and enforcing security requirements.

Example embodiments described herein can mitigate fraud by employing a centralized utility (e.g., ACH network 130) that can analyze network level data to identify and report potential fraudulent behavior to origination and receive points, and enable the exchange of information between financial institutions regarding fraudulent activity. Also, in one example herein, a tiered approach is taken to address threats, based on participation. For example, financial institutions may not participate in real-time payments at the same level (e.g., some may participate at a level where by both can send and receive real-time payments, while others will only receive such payments, and some institutions may carry great inherent risk owing to participation level and volume of payments covered). As such, risk control may be associated with the activities that a financial institution is offering and be additive in nature based on level of participation.

Preferably, the centralized utility (e.g., network 130) that analyzes network level data to identify and report potential fraudulent behavior can detect anomalous sending and receiving activity with alerts to the financial institutions that are impacted, perform velocity checks on origination, receive, and request for payment volumes, and be able to detect patterns that indicate potential network fraud or money mule activity. To address fraud mitigation needs of a real-time system, the centralized utility can analyze network level data to identify and report potential fraudulent behavior to origination and receive points, and serve as a platform to allow for the exchange of information between financial institutions regarding fraudulent activity.

Preferably, the utility also can provide alerts with reason codes upon the detection of anomalous activity for impacted financial institutions, provide access to network data to augment financial institution fraud detection and risk management, and perform fraud analytics to provide regular fraud reporting to participating financial institutions. Also, preferably the utility can track complaints of excessive abuse of request for real time payments and send notification to a receiver's FI, can support the exchange of reported fraud incidents among financial institutions, and can provide payment data elements to support receiving FI risk management, such as by providing data on origination channel and device ID, and accommodating geolocation data for a sender. The utility preferably also can provide data to support sending FI risk management, such as, for example, data specifying an age of receiving accounts.

Participating financial institutions may be required to comply with FFIEC guidelines as applied through a regulator examination, report fraudulent behavior to an entity responsible for the ACH network 130 and/or to sending financial institutions, and react to alerts from a centralized activity monitoring utility.

Participating financial institutions that also send payments also may be required to comply with requirements for all participating financial institutions, have a minimum of two factor authentication (as defined through a real-time payments governance process), require registration of customers sending payments, conduct real-time fraud screening for payments being originated thereby, have a capability to assign risk based sending value limits to customers, and avoid the use of including active hyperlinks (as defined by a real-time payments governance process) in payment and non-payment messages.

Also in one example herein, participating financial institutions that allow customers to make requests for payment must comply with requirements for all participating sending and receiving financial institutions, make warranties and representations that requests for payment are for legitimate purposes, comply with requirements similar to those for origination of ACH debits (determined through a governance process), and financial institutions must be able to respond to network reports of abuse of requests for payment, and have the ability to suspend users' access to the network.

Participating financial institutions that allow for third party payments may be required to comply with requirements for all participating sending and receiving financial institutions that allow customers to initiate requests for payment, provide warranties and representations that the third party is abiding by rules for payment origination, apply the same requirements to third party payment services that are applied to financial institutions that send real-time payments and allow requests for payment (as applicable), and follow FFIEC guidelines regarding third party relationships. Additionally, such financial institutions also should have a capability to enforce rules against FIs and third parties, including an ability to levy fines and suspend activities on the network. The financial institutions also should not allow third parties to originate volumes greater than their financial resources can support in the case of third party failures.

Security measures also can be taken regarding requirements for directory services. As an example, it may be required that a directory service cannot store account information (i.e., it should store tokens only), and have a robust entry maintenance process to ensure that entries are reliable and updated on a timely basis. Ideally, directory services have the ability to allow customers to change their alias affiliation through their registrars, aliases can be registered only in the directory through a financial institution or third party sponsored by a financial institution, and the registrar is responsible for maintaining aliases by providing a process to verify the identity of an alias owner, and by providing warranties and representations that aliases are associated with correct accounts. Preferably, directory access is restricted to financial institutions for the purposes of routing payments (i.e., no direct third party is permitted access to the directory), and industry standard data protection is complied with as it applies to financial institution data processors. Other requirements may include that the directory service must be able to provide the name and address of the receiver to the sending FI to support error prevention, risk management and regulatory compliance (e.g., OFAC screening, AML), and must have a robust entry maintenance process to ensure that entries are reliable and updated on a timely basis.

The payment system herein is useful in that, in one example embodiment herein, it processes credits only versus debits, and thus privacy protection is maintained. A transaction is generated and sent through the ACH network 130 from a sending institution upon that institution receiving instructions from a payer, and only if the payer has sufficient funds available to cover the transaction value and has been duly authenticated (e.g., at the sending financial institution).

The use of a credit “push only” model addresses funds availability and risk management concerns (e.g., insufficient funds, payment authorization, multi-party authentication, PCI, etc.), and offers transparency and control for end users. Any case can be addressed by credit push, such as, for example, a business to person application, a person to person application, a person to business application, and a business to business application. In one, non-limiting example embodiment herein, debits are not employed in the method herein because current debit and credit card payment systems work well for existing debit use cases, and requests for payments followed by credit transfer might be a superior form of debit. A credit transfer system is inherently safer than a payment system that allows a payee to debit a payer. Even if hacked, the amount vulnerable is limited to merely the amount of funds in each account.

In the system herein, a debit capability can be emulated using a request to pay from a payee to a payer, wherein the payee initiates a request for payment from the payer, the payer receives a notification of the request for payment and authorizes a credit transfer to the payee. This approach gives the payer a level of control over the payment process. A credit push only model addresses funds availability and risk management concerns. For example, for a sending institution, there is a risk that a fraudulent transaction is attempted to be initiated by a fraudster. The sending bank can verify that there are sufficient funds available to cover the transaction, and that the payer has authenticated itself. In a debit pull situation, on the other hand, a bank initiating a transaction for a payee does not necessarily know the payer, or whether the payer has funds sufficient to cover a transaction. Also in a debit pull situation, advanced fraud protection mechanisms typically cannot be employed (e.g., transaction analytics, pattern recognition, etc.). Funds also are not made immediately available.

As described above, in one example embodiment the system has the ability to send or receive payments on a 24/7 basis, provides immediate notification to senders and receivers, immediate fund availability to recipients on a 24/7 basis, and employs an extensive set of payment and non-payment messages. The system provides payment certainty for receivers, a process to request the return of erroneous payments, and, in one example embodiment, also employs value limits on transactions updated periodically based on predetermined criteria. Settlement is performed in a manner that mitigates material risk of loss, and preferably tokenization of all account data is employed such that payments can be initiated using an alias accounting/routing number. A threshold level of security can be required to provide privacy protection of all participating financial institutions.

Real-Time Payments—Immediate Availability of Funds for Receivers

In one example embodiment herein, a receiving FI can be required to make payments available immediately to the extent possible, and to comply with all applicable laws (e.g., AML, OFAC) and necessary risk management processes (fraud monitoring). For example, funds can be made available immediately, within seconds, minutes, hours, multiple times daily, at the end of the day, and can be tied to settlement, in some embodiments. Availability exceptions are a small fraction of total payments. This provides consistent expectations for payees and payers, allows for an expanded number of use cases, and limits confusion for payers and payees. Pre-screening transactions at the network level can minimize exceptions (e.g. AML, OFAC, fraud suspects), and notifications can be provided to payees for transactions that cannot be immediately screened.

Transaction Value Limits

In one example embodiment, payment value limits are employed to mitigate risk. For example, a pre-determined value limit on transactions is employed to limit exposure to credit or liquidity risk between sending and receiving banks. This has the advantage of limiting the amount of credit, settlement, and/or liquidity risk, and reduces potential risk from fraud events.

System-wide transaction value limits (e.g., $25,000) can be employed based on risk tolerances of institutions and research into use cases. Sending FIs also may impose limits (e.g., lower limits) per day or per transaction or on some other predetermined basis. In one example, a receiving FI cannot impose a lower limit on its receivers, and there is a process for updating limits based on objective criteria, such as, for example, periodic evaluations (e.g., analyzing transaction data, model settlement risk, survey unmet needs, etc.), and automatic triggers are employed when limits are exceeded (e.g., transaction thresholds, loss rates, or the like). In example embodiments herein, payment transactions can be evaluated at a sending and/or receiving FI, at the ACH network 130, and/or at another element of the system 100, to determine whether a payment amount specified in the transaction equals or exceeds the limit. If the limit is equaled or exceeded, then the evaluating element can provide an alert indicative thereof to the sending and/or receiving FI or another element of the system 100, and, in one example embodiment herein, the transaction is discontinued/not effected.

FIs also may manage sending limits based on, for example, customer segments and use cases, structuring of multiple transactions to circumvent limits, and overall customer activity. In certain countries, certain value limits are employed. For example, Poland employs a limit at $27,500 or 100,000zt, in Japan transactions over $842,500 or ¥100 million are diverted to real time gross settlement, and in South Africa there is a limit of $430,000 or ZAR 5 Million until 16:00 hr, and $21,500 or ZAR 250,000 during non-business hours. In the UK there is a limit of $155,00 or £100,0001.

Setting a payments limit mitigates exposure to fraud, credit, and liquidity risk while still enabling customers to benefit from real-time payments. A limit on transactions can help prevent minor errors and challenges associated with new systems. A limit also can mitigate credit/liquidity risk for banks and reduce fraud risk. An initial limit of, for example, $25,000 allows most customers to benefit from real-time payments as follows:

P2P transfers: a threshold high enough to cover transfers to family for emergencies,

P2B ad-hoc: a limit still covers emergency bill payments. Covers many stock purchases and will cover more as limits migrate over time,

B2B ad-hoc: a threshold covers most small business just-in-time supplier payments and some emergency bill payments, but may cover more if the limit migrates over time,

B2P ad-hoc high value: a limit covers many insurance claims or legal settlements, but could cover more if the limit migrates over time,

B2B ad-hoc low value: a limit covers temporary employee wages and emergency payroll, since they are individual transactions.

Limits can be raised incrementally where deemed appropriate.

Settlement and Settlement Risk Mitigation

Effective settlement risk management mechanism(s) ensure that a payer has funds available to settle a transaction/credit to a payee (e.g., pre-funding or funds not available to payee until after settlement). Such management is useful because it provides improved customer experience in the event of a FI failure, fraud, etc. Such a mechanism decreases a receiving financial institution's risk, and insures overall integrity and trust of the payment system. Settlement cycles can be at predetermined time, such as, e.g., the end of day, multiple times/day, in real-time, etc. Interbank settlement should effectively eliminate material risk to receiving FIs that sending FIs will not meet their obligation to settle. For net settlement systems, there should be reduction of risk associated with unsettled debit positions. Settling more frequently can limit the build up of large unsettled debit positions.

According to an example aspect herein, FI settlement accounts are pre-funded. Prefunding of settlement pools mitigates the risk of unsettled positions. Also, different settlement mechanisms can be employed for large credit worthy FIs versus smaller and non-credit worthy FIs.

There are several models for settlement management that can be considered while balancing funds availability needs. For example, in a PIN/Debit system, funds in a payer's account are captured immediately, and may become available in a payee account in 2-3 days. Settlement typically occurs one time per day. In Japan, real-time funds availability is provided, as is end of day settlement for non-RTGS payments (over maximum value). In Korea there is immediate fund availability, and deferred net settlement (next day). In India there is real-time funds availability, and end of day net settlement. In China there is funds availability within 20 seconds, and deferred net settlement. Each of those is a daily settlement model.

Multiple per day settlement models also exist. For example, with respect to funds availability, in Chile a receiving bank must respond within 10 seconds, and there are settlements two times per day through RTGS. In Sweden there is near real-time (within 15 seconds) funds availability, and multiple deferred central bank settlements per day. In South Africa funds availability is within 60 seconds, and there is deferred net settlement (hourly during the business day). In Denmark, funds availability is in near real-time (1-10 seconds), and there is Net, intraday settlement. Singapore has near real-time (seconds) funds availability, and deferred settlement 2 times per day (with intention of increasing cycles as system matures). In the United Kingdom for funds availability there is 15 second confirmation, posting within 2 hours, and deferred net settlement, 3 times per day.

Real Time settlement management systems also exist. For example, in Brazil 97% of funds are released in less than one minute, and there is continuous net settlement. In Switzerland there is purported real-time funds availability and real-time settlement. In Mexico funds availability occurs within a maximum of one minute and 5 seconds, end-to-end. Poland has near real-time (seconds) funds availability, and immediate settlement.

In one example embodiment herein, the real-time payment system employs pre-funding of accounts and net settlement, with multiple settlements per day to mitigate the build-up of unsettled positions, although this example is not limiting. Indeed, other types of settlement can be employed, such as, without limitation, any of the types represented in FIG. 44. Settlement can be performed or at least partially be effected by, for example, the settlement facility 134 and or settlement system 133 of FIG. 1.

As pointed out above, settlement herein can employ a hybrid approach to mitigate risk of default, including a pre-funded account and allowance for qualified FIs to carry an unfunded net debit position. Regarding prefunding, financial institutions (e.g., 111 and 120) can deposit a full or partial settlement obligation amount in cash into one or more settlement accounts prior to a clearing, and the pre-funded balance is used to settle net positions at scheduled times. The account(s) can be maintained by, for example, a settlement facility such as facility 134 or service 133, or at another location. With respect to a multilateral net debit cap, in one example herein there is a limit on the net unfunded settlement position for participating FIs across all counterparties, and the net unfunded settlement position is the amount by which the net debit position exceeds an FI's balance in the pre-funded settlement account. Clearing can be suspended when the net unfunded debit position reaches the net debit cap. Also, in one example herein the limit is based on credit risk criteria pre-established through, for example, a governance process. It may happen that an FI may have a zero net debit cap, which means that the FI must pre-fund its entire settlement position. Conversely, if an FI has a zero balance in the pre-funded settlement account, its multilateral net debit cap represents its entire settlement capacity. FIs can deposit funds into the pre-funded settlement account to initiate payments that exceed their net debit cap. Loss-sharing agreements can be employed wherein remaining participants cover losses in the event of a settlement default; for example, a loss sharing formula established through governance process.

FIG. 43 represents an example of the impact on a total settlement capacity 4300 for a FI, in a case where pre-funding is employed in conjunction with a net debit cap, or where only one of those is employed. FIG. 43 shows a situation 4302 where a FI has a pre-funded balance 4305 in a settlement account and a net debit cap 4304, a situation 4306 where a FI has a zero net debit cap and a prefunded balance 4301 in a settlement account, and a situation 4307 where a FI has a zero pre-funded balance and a net debit cap 4303 in a settlement account. Thus, for example, for situation 4302, if the debit allowance 4304 is $1,000,000, and the pre-funded balance 4305 is $1,000,000, and the applicable FT requests settlement in the amount of $2,000,000 or less, then settlement will occur (although the FI may be required to replenish the pre-funded amount). However, assuming the amount of balance 4301 is $1,000,000, settlement for $2,000,000 would not take place in scenario 4306 because the balance is exceeded. Also, assuming the net debit cap 4303 is $1,600,000 in scenario 4307, then a settlement in the amount of $2,000,000 also would not take place because the cap is exceeded. However, settlement for an amount of $1,600,000 or less would take place in scenario 4307.

Thus, as can be understood in view hereof, and referring to FIG. 46, a method herein includes the settlement service 133 comparing (step 4600) a financial position of at least one FI (e.g., a position of the FI resulting from conducting transactions, such as, without limitation, payment transactions according to the methods herein) to a combination of a value of a pre-funded balance (if any) in a settlement account and a value of a net debit cap (if any). Also, the service 133 can recognize when an unfunded settlement position has reached a predetermined net debit cap (which can be unilateral and based on a particular FI, or multilateral based on multiple FIs), and then effect settlement multiple times per day in order to reduce the positions below the cap (or it can employ any other settlement mechanism such as those of FIG. 44, to reduce the positions). Thus, if it is determined that the combination of the net debit cap and pre-funded amount is exceeded in step 4700 (“Yes in step 4700), then settlement is suspended (step 4800). Otherwise, if the combination is determined not to be exceeded in step 4700 (“No” in step 4700), then settlement occurs in step 4900. That step can be effected according to any predetermined settlement technique, such as, for example, settlement multiple times per day or using any other suitable settlement technique (e.g., including, without limitation, any of those represented in FIG. 44).

Also, in accordance with an example embodiment herein, in the case of multiple settlements, the frequency thereof can be determined to avoid a predetermined level of unsettled net debit positions on the part of FIs, and to prevent large unfunded positions. For example, the settlement service 133 and/or settlement facility 134 can evaluate whether the unsettled positions of all participating FIs, or a subset thereof, exceeds a predetermined threshold (e.g., 10% of the FIs have unsettled debit positions exceeding a predetermined threshold amount). If the threshold is exceeded, then the service 133 and/or facility 134 can increase the frequency at which settlements occur and/or schedule and conduct one or more additional settlements that were not previously scheduled. In the event losses occur owing to one or more FIs not funding their unfunded positions in time, then the losses can be shared (funded) between multiple FIs, based on predetermined criteria.

Tokenization

Regarding tokenization, that involves use of a unique code that can only be used to post transactions to an account. It can be useful because a payer does not receive a payee's account data, there is no need for a PCI-type of security for a payer. Tokens are safe even if exposed in a cyber attack. Also, mass payment fraud is more difficult to execute.

Tokenization can be provided in a dynamic versus static manner. Tokenization is a preferred approach to secure mobile and e-commerce payments using credit and debit cards. Tokenization substitutes a limited-use random number (secure digital token) for a customer's account number so that the sensitive information remains safe. Even if compromised, the token is of limited or no use to cybercriminals. Tokenization as used in the example embodiments herein can involve various aspects. For example, one is a dynamic token, in which the token for each transaction is unique rendering the token itself unusable for any other transaction. Another is a static token, wherein the same token is used for multiple transactions, but may be restricted to prevent unauthorized use (e.g., credit only, single merchant). Still another is a domain restriction, that provides further fraud reduction by limiting token use to a certain digital wallet, merchant, channel (e.g., e-commerce), amount, transaction type (e.g. credit or debit) or expiration date. For a token vault, bank (or multi-bank) vaults create tokens, perform customer authentication and provision tokens to digital wallets or directories.

Regarding directory services, by virtue of the directory and use of tokens, senders can initiate payments using an alias (e.g., a phone number, email, or other code, etc.) which is used to retrieve bank routing information from a database. As such, receivers do not need to provide account numbers to senders, and senders do not assume a risk of holding receivers account numbers.

Optional Travel Rule Requirements

Various elements of the system 100 may be required, in one example herein, to comply with certain travel-related rules. For example, a financial institution can be required to include in a transmittal order for any funds for a transfer of $3,000 or more, the following:

-   -   a name of the transmitter (the party requesting the transfer),         and, if the payment is ordered from an account, the account         number of the transmittor     -   an address of the transmittor     -   an amount of the transmittal order     -   a date of the transmittal order     -   an identity of the recipient's financial institution.

A transmittor's financial institution can receive with the transmittal order (from the transmittor):

-   -   a name and address of the recipient     -   an account number of the recipient     -   any other specific identifier of the recipient     -   either the name and address or the numerical identifier of the         transmittor's financial institution.

Travel rules may apply in B2B transactions, for example.

It also generally applies to bill payments initiated by a business. Such rules can be subject to certain exceptions, such as an “electronic funds transfer” governed by Regulation E (i.e., a transfer that a consumer initiates from his or her account), and situations where both the transmitter and the recipient (i.e., the beneficial recipient of the funds) are any of the following:

-   -   a domestic bank;     -   a wholly owned domestic subsidiary of a domestic bank;     -   a domestic broker or dealer in securities;     -   a wholly owned domestic subsidiary of a domestic broker or         dealer in securities;     -   a domestic futures commission merchant or an introducing broker         in commodities;     -   a wholly owned domestic subsidiary of a domestic futures         commission merchant or an introducing broker in commodities;     -   the United States;     -   a Federal agency or instrumentality;     -   a state or local government;     -   a state or local agency or instrumentality; or     -   a domestic mutual fund.

The real-time payment system herein is a platform for financial institutions to develop novel, compelling, and commercially viable products and services for their customers. The system is adaptable to meet the changing needs associated with market expectations and risk environments that are prone to change over time. The system supports robust, flexible data models and message types and has an architecture that supports modular service integration. In one example embodiment herein, the system has global compatibility, and, consistent with domestic U.S. requirements, the system adheres to widely used global standards (e.g., ISO 20022) and the processes/conventions used by real-time payment systems in other countries to facility future interoperability, and to ease the implementation burden for multi-national banks and companies.

As described above, the real-time system 100 herein, in one example embodiment, employs “Credit Push” payments where customers can send payments directly from their existing accounts, providing greater customer engagement and transparency than alternative payment services. The system 100 also, in one example, employs standard but extensible message formats, and supports independent product development by financial institutions through powerful, flexible standards while ensuring that the overall end-to-end process is consistent and reliable. Real-time messaging also is provided with “bank-grade” security, in that is provided financial institutions with tools to create a superior customer experience in applications such as mobile banking, P2P transfers, bill payments, just-in-time B2B transactions, etc. The system 100 also uses integrated tokenization and directory services to eliminate need for customers to share sensitive account information or know routing details of recipients. The system 100 thus is fundamentally safer, more-convenient, and more-capable than existing payment systems.

In the foregoing description, example aspects are described with reference to several example embodiments. Accordingly, the specification should be regarded as illustrative, rather than restrictive. Similarly, the figures illustrated in the drawings, which highlight the functionality and advantages of the example embodiments, are presented for example purposes only. The architecture of the example embodiments is sufficiently flexible and configurable, such that it may be utilized (and navigated) in ways other than those shown in the accompanying figures.

Software embodiments may be provided as a sequence of instructions, or software, which may be stored on an article of manufacture, e.g., a computer-readable medium having instructions. The instructions on the computer-readable medium may be used to program a computer system or other electronic device. The computer-readable medium may include, but is not limited to, floppy diskettes, optical disks, CD-ROMs, and magneto-optical disks or other types of media suitable for storing electronic instructions.

The techniques described herein, when performed using a computer system, are not limited to any particular software configuration. They may find applicability in any computing or processing environment. The terms “computer-readable medium” and “memory” refer to any medium that is capable of storing, encoding, or transmitting a sequence of instructions for execution by a computer system and that causes the computer system to perform any technique described herein. Furthermore, it is common in the art to speak of software, in one form or another (e.g., program, procedure, process, application, logic, and so on) as taking an action or causing a result. Such expressions are merely a shorthand way of stating that the execution of the software by a computer system causes the processor to perform an action to produce a result. In other embodiments, functions performed by software can instead be performed by hardcoded modules, and thus the example embodiments herein are not limited only for use with stored software programs. In addition, it is not necessary that processes described herein be performed with a computer system, and instead they can be performed, in whole or in part, by a human operator.

It should be noted that, although described in the context of a healthcare billing and payment environment, the scope of the invention is not limited for use in that environment only, and also can be used for transactions involving other environments as well, including, for example and without limitation, any suitable type of environment involving bill presentment and payment.

Although example aspects have been described in certain specific embodiments, many additional modifications and variations would be apparent to those skilled in the art. It thus should be understood that the example embodiments may be practiced in ways other than those specifically described. Again, the present example embodiments should be considered in all respects as illustrative and not restrictive. 

1-12. (canceled)
 13. A method for performing a financial settlement, comprising: pre-funding a financial settlement account with a balance; comparing an unsettled financial position of a financial institution to a combination of a value of the balance of the financial settlement account and a value of a net debit cap; determining whether to perform a financial settlement based on a result of the comparing; and performing a financial settlement where it is determined that the unsettled financial position of the financial institution is not greater than the combination, wherein the financial settlement is performed multiple times within a predetermined time period.
 14. The method of claim 13, further comprising: determining whether there is a predetermined number of financial institutions that have unsettled financial positions; and increasing a frequency at which financial settlements are performed, in response to determining that there is the predetermined number of financial institutions that have unsettled financial positions. 15-20. (canceled)
 21. The method of claim 13, wherein the performing of the financial settlement includes performing financial settlement multiple times per day.
 22. The method of claim 13, wherein the unsettled financial position of the financial institution is a position of the financial institution resulting from at least one transaction.
 23. The method of claim 13, further comprising: determining when an unfunded settlement position has reached a predetermined net debit cap; and effecting financial settlement multiple times per day to reduce the unfunded settlement position below the predetermined net debit cap.
 24. The method of claim 13, further comprising performing financial settlements at an increased frequency, in response to a determination that there is a predetermined level of unsettled financial positions on the part of financial institutions.
 25. The method of claim 13, wherein the comparing compares the unsettled financial position of the financial institution to the combination to determine whether the combination is exceeded, and wherein the method further comprises suspending financial settlement in response to determining that the combination is exceeded.
 26. The method of claim 14, wherein the increasing is performed to avoid a predetermined level of unsettled net debit positions.
 27. The method of claim 14, further comprising scheduling one or more additional settlements that were not previously scheduled where it is determined that there is a predetermined level of unsettled financial positions on the part of financial institutions.
 28. The method of claim 13, further comprising sharing losses between financial institutions.
 29. The method of claim 28, wherein the losses are a result of one or more of the financial institutions not timely funding unfunded positions.
 30. The method of claim 13, wherein the performing of the financial settlement includes performing at least one of real-time gross settlement, immediate netting of offsetting positions, close-to-immediate settlement, multiple net settlements, settlement after business hours, or next day settlement of net amount.
 31. A computer-readable medium storing instructions which, when executed by a computer processor, cause the computer processor to perform a method for conducting a financial settlement, the method comprising: pre-funding a financial settlement account with a balance; comparing an unsettled financial position of a financial institution to a combination of a value of the balance of the financial settlement account and a value of a net debit cap; determining whether to perform a financial settlement based on a result of the comparing; and performing a financial settlement where it is determined that the unsettled financial position of the financial institution is not greater than the combination, wherein the financial settlement is performed multiple times within a predetermined time period.
 32. The computer-readable medium of claim 31, wherein the method further comprises: determining whether there is a predetermined number of financial institutions that have unsettled financial positions; and increasing a frequency at which financial settlements are performed, in response to determining that there is the predetermined number of financial institutions that have unsettled financial positions.
 33. The computer-readable medium of claim 31, wherein the performing of the financial settlement includes performing financial settlement multiple times per day.
 34. The computer-readable medium of claim 31, wherein the unsettled financial position of the financial institution is a position of the financial institution resulting from at least one transaction.
 35. The computer-readable medium of claim 31, wherein the method further comprises: determining when an unfunded settlement position has reached a predetermined net debit cap; and effecting financial settlement multiple times per day to reduce the unfunded settlement position below the predetermined net debit cap.
 36. The computer-readable medium of claim 31, wherein the method further comprises performing financial settlements at an increased frequency, in response to a determination that there is a predetermined level of unsettled financial positions on the part of financial institutions.
 37. The computer-readable medium of claim 31, wherein the comparing compares the unsettled financial position of the financial institution to the combination to determine whether the combination is exceeded, and wherein the method further comprises suspending financial settlement in response to determining that the combination is exceeded.
 38. The computer-readable medium of claim 32, wherein the increasing is performed to avoid a predetermined level of unsettled net debit positions.
 39. The computer-readable medium of claim 32, wherein the method further comprises scheduling one or more additional settlements that were not previously scheduled where it is determined that there is a predetermined level of unsettled financial positions on the part of financial institutions.
 40. The computer-readable medium of claim 31, wherein the method further comprises sharing losses between financial institutions.
 41. The computer-readable medium of claim 40, wherein the losses are a result of one or more of the financial institutions not timely funding unfunded positions.
 42. The computer-readable medium of claim 31, wherein the performing of the financial settlement includes performing at least one of real-time gross settlement, immediate netting of offsetting positions, close-to-immediate settlement, multiple net settlements, settlement after business hours, or next day settlement of net amount.
 43. A system for conducting financial settlement, the system comprising: a memory storing a program; and a computer processor arranged to execute the program to perform a method comprising: pre-funding a financial settlement account with a balance, comparing an unsettled financial position of a financial institution to a combination of a value of the balance of the financial settlement account and a value of a net debit cap, determining whether to perform a financial settlement based on a result of the comparing, and performing a financial settlement where it is determined that the unsettled financial position of the financial institution is not greater than the combination, wherein the financial settlement is performed multiple times within a predetermined time period.
 44. The system of claim 43, wherein the method further comprises: determining whether there is a predetermined number of financial institutions that have unsettled financial positions; and increasing a frequency at which financial settlements are performed, in response to determining that there is the predetermined number of financial institutions that have unsettled financial positions.
 45. The system of claim 43, wherein the performing of the financial settlement includes performing financial settlement multiple times per day.
 46. The system of claim 43, wherein the unsettled financial position of the financial institution is a position of the financial institution resulting from at least one transaction.
 47. The system of claim 43, wherein the method further comprises: determining when an unfunded settlement position has reached a predetermined net debit cap; and effecting financial settlement multiple times per day to reduce the unfunded settlement position below the predetermined net debit cap.
 48. The system of claim 43, wherein the method further comprises performing financial settlements at an increased frequency, in response to a determination that there is a predetermined level of unsettled financial positions on the part of financial institutions.
 49. The system of claim 43, wherein the comparing compares the unsettled financial position of the financial institution to the combination to determine whether the combination is exceeded, and wherein the method further comprises suspending financial settlement in response to determining that the combination is exceeded.
 50. The system of claim 44, wherein the increasing is performed to avoid a predetermined level of unsettled net debit positions.
 51. The system of claim 44, wherein the method further comprises scheduling one or more additional settlements that were not previously scheduled where it is determined that there is a predetermined level of unsettled financial positions on the part of financial institutions.
 52. The system of claim 43, wherein the method further comprises sharing losses between financial institutions.
 53. The system of claim 52, wherein the losses are a result of one or more of the financial institutions not timely funding unfunded positions.
 54. The system of claim 43, wherein the performing of the financial settlement includes performing at least one of real-time gross settlement, immediate netting of offsetting positions, close-to-immediate settlement, multiple net settlements, settlement after business hours, or next day settlement of net amount. 